




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Challenging Nova Scotia's Climate Change Plan to Do Better

Jara de Hoog, Alice Cohen, & Andrew Biro

In Nova Scotia and beyond, policies and actions intended to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions enough to prevent dangerously surging temperatures have largely failed to do so (NOAA, 2024; Tiseo, 2023), despite the obvious and overwhelming importance of achieving this objective. Lack of scientific knowledge is not to blame: the existential threat posed by climate change has been widely known since at least 1988, when the phenomenon was described at the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere as “almost as serious as nuclear war” (Gupta, 2010). Yet as the number of climate-related policies, agreements, and organizations proliferated following this frightening declaration, so too, paradoxically, did global annual GHG emissions. Aside from declines in 2009 and 2020 because of the financial crisis and COVID pandemic, global GHG emissions have continued to increase every year

and annual emissions in 2023 are about 50% higher than they were in 2000 (Tiseo, 2023). Tellingly, global GDP during this time followed the exact same trend (Roser et al., 2023).

This paper is premised on the idea that there is a systemic problem in contemporary climate policy that has led to ineffective climate action. Specifically, we follow the school of thought that climate policy's inefficacy stems from its refusal to challenge economic growth and profit-based production (Klein, 2014; Adler, 2015; Hickel & Kallis, 2019). It has pursued the ever-elusive goal of absolutely decoupling economic growth from GHG emissions instead of acknowledging that a perpetually expanding economy makes the emissions cuts needed to remain below dangerous temperature thresholds much more difficult to achieve (Høyer, 2010; Hickel & Kallis, 2019). Furthermore, the cumulative amount of GHGs released has increased to the point that it is now extremely unlikely that the economy could be decoupled from emissions fast enough to make the required cuts while preserving economic growth (Hickel & Kallis, 2019). We argue that more radical and creative policy approaches—ones that prioritize long-term flourishing over maintaining the destructive status quo—are needed to address the climate crisis.

The Nova Scotia government's recent climate policies contain some radical elements but fall short of pursuing transformative change. In fall 2021, the government passed the Environmental Goals and Climate Change Reduction Act (EGCCRA), which, among other goals, legislated a 53% reduction in provincial GHG emissions by 2030 and net-zero emissions by 2050 (Environmental Goals and Climate Change Reduction Act, 2021). Then, in December 2022, it released a more detailed climate plan, entitled "Our Climate, Our Future: Nova Scotia's Climate Change Plan for Clean Growth" (Nova Scotia, 2022) (hereafter referred to as "the Plan"). The Plan contains 68 policy actions intended to achieve its legally binding emissions goals. These include bolstering renewable energy production, funding electric mobility, and regulating the building sector. The Plan states that its actions are based upon the four principles of Netukulimk (a Mi'kmaw concept related to achieving well-being without degrading the environment (Unama'ki Institute of Natural Resources, n.d.)), sustainability, equity, and a circular economy (one in which the longevity and usefulness of resources and goods is maximized while waste is minimized).

Though the government’s optimistic emission modelling and ambitious goals paint a rosy picture of Nova Scotia’s future, our analysis shows that the changes envisioned by the Plan are too shallow to achieve these goals and are at odds with the principles that are claimed to be its foundation. Instead of challenging the problematic cultural and material supremacy of growth and profit, the Plan consistently sides with an imperative for economic growth through technological development. At the same time, there are elements of the Plan that do have the potential to contribute meaningfully to achieving the ambitious goals presented. In this report, we present the results of our systematic analysis of the Plan’s political/economic approaches to climate action, then suggest changes to bring the province’s climate strategy in line with the requirements for a safe and just future and with its own stated principles.

Our Research

To analyse the Plan and how it challenges or reinforces the centrality of growth and profit in climate action, we created two spectra along which each relevant policy action in the Plan was assessed. Both spectra were formulated such that one end represented an approach to climate action that is more in line with pursuing “green growth” and profit maximization and the other a more radical one that prioritizes climate change mitigation over the perpetual pursuit of economic growth. The first spectrum was “technological/cultural”. Policy actions were “technological” if their main mechanism for reducing emissions was the substitution of carbon-intensive technology with less carbon-intensive technology. At the other end of that spectrum, actions were “cultural” if emissions reductions were to be achieved mainly by changing practices and values to reduce overall consumption. For example, replacing gas-powered vehicles with electric ones is a technological climate action, while replacing vehicle trips and purchases with expanded mass transit is a cultural action.

It is important to note that the distinction between cultural and technological actions is not absolute. Technological changes can prompt or require corresponding cultural changes, and cultural changes can enable new technological changes. For example, the growing affordability and accessibility of solar panels (a new technology) reduces individuals’ and communities’ dependence on the energy grid. In this way, switching to solar creates the conditions for a cultural shift away from privatized, centralized, monopolistic, and fossil-fuel powered energy grids (as we currently have in Nova Scotia) toward decentralized,

autonomous, and renewable energy production. From this logic, it also follows that not all technological climate actions are negative; many, such as energy decarbonization, are positive and necessary. Technological actions only become problematic when they are the main or sole type of action proposed to address the climate crisis. Certain root factors of environmental crisis, such as an economy geared toward infinite growth and the view that humans are separate from and superior to the rest of nature, cannot be solved only with new technologies, even if these technologies lead to some degree of cultural change. To truly solve these problems, our society's collective values, including the ways they are materially expressed through economic and political practices, must shift toward interdependence and reciprocity among humans and non-humans. For this reason, we consider it essential to understand whether a given climate action strategy pursues cultural change in addition to technological change.

The second spectrum was “individual/collective”. Policy actions were “individual” to the extent that they placed responsibility for acting on climate change primarily upon individuals, households, and businesses, whose actions were to be coordinated through market mechanisms. Policies were “collective” to the extent that actions were to be undertaken by groups using social coordination, including regulations, beyond the confines of market transactions. For example, encouraging electric vehicle purchases through tax incentives is an individual action, while creating publicly owned electric car-share services is a collective action.

As with the previous spectrum, the distinction between individual and collective actions is not always clear-cut, nor are individual actions to be avoided at all costs. Individual behaviour must certainly change as part of climate action. However, addressing the root of the climate crisis requires changing the systems, including capitalism and colonialism, and infrastructure, including fossil-fuel generated power and car-centric planning, that led to it and continue to exacerbate it. These systems are collective products and can only be changed through coordinated social actions such as policy change, protest, and institutional change. This collective nature of the climate crisis is why our analysis focuses on the importance of collective actions.

Figure 1 compiles our assessments of each action onto a compass chart, offering a snapshot of the ideological framing of the Nova Scotia government’s approach to climate action. The numbers next to the dots refer to the actions from the Plan’s numerical list that were placed at that point on the chart. Phrases (i.e., “Clean Economy”) refer to a group of actions with a similar theme. We determined the position of each action by comparing it to four sets of criteria, one for each endpoint on the spectrums. The more strongly an action matched a set of criteria, the closer its placement on the chart was to that endpoint. When an action matched both sets of criteria for one spectrum, we used information such as funding, examples from other jurisdictions, and legislative or regulatory action to determine whether one end of the spectrum was more heavily prioritized.




Figure 1. Ideological alignments of mitigation-related actions in the Plan.

Patterns in Nova Scotia's Climate Plan

Reliance on Technology

The overwhelming majority of policy actions in the Plan are technological. Of the 47 relevant actions in the Plan, 44 take an approach to moderating emissions that is more technological than cultural (actions 1-12, 14-16, 45-49, 67, and 68 in the Plan are excluded because they do not relate to reducing provincial GHG emissions). In general, these technological actions pursue four different avenues of change. They aim to substitute fossil fuel-generated electricity with wind- and solar-generated electricity, make buildings more energy-efficient, replace gas-powered vehicles with electric ones, and develop and commercialize “green” business and consumer technologies and products. Many of these actions are ambitious, transformative, and properly funded. One example is the province’s commitment to making its energy mix 80% renewables and phasing out coal-fired electricity generation by 2030. The government has already signed procurement deals that require Nova Scotia Power (NSP), the province’s privatized electricity utility, to purchase power from five large new wind developments for 25 years following their construction (Smith, 2022). In short, the government is mobilizing hundreds of millions of dollars to meet its electricity generation goals through the deployment of renewable energy technologies. Similar financial mobilization is displayed in the government’s generous subsidies for heat pumps, building retrofits, and electric heating.

Conversely, the government displays little such ambition with respect to cultural solutions. The Plan only offers three cultural actions, all of which relate to expanding provincial mass and active transit infrastructure to encourage a cultural shift away from car dependency. While this is a laudable goal, the investments are meagre compared to what is necessary. The roughly \$10 million that the province spent from 2022 to 2023, through the Plan and similar initiatives, on maintaining and expanding mass and active transit (“Government Supports Public Transportation”, 2023; Infrastructure Canada, 2023) is just a drop in the bucket compared to the hundreds of millions of dollars the province spends each year on its road network (Nova Scotia News, 2023a).

Individual and Collective Actions

In contrast to the Plan’s overwhelming focus on technological climate actions, its policies are distributed more uniformly along the individual/collective spectrum. In other words, in the context of climate policy, the government does not place responsibility for climate action exclusively on individuals, households and businesses acting within a free market setting.

Actions falling on the individual side include opt-in programs for businesses to undertake climate action, such as voluntary commercial energy-use monitoring. Also present are programs to commercialize “green” technologies, most notably hydrogen fuel produced from wind energy, and consumer education and rebate programs, including for electric transportation. Actions falling on the collective side include reducing the carbon intensity of infrastructure under the government’s control, such as electricity generation and public transportation, funding for small-scale climate action projects in communities, a significant fraction of which is specifically earmarked for non-profit organizations, and energy retrofits for equity-deserving communities.

Many actions on both sides of the spectrum are afforded plenty of funding and political priority. On the individual side, the government has moved to enable the growth and profitability of the hydrogen-fuel sector by amending a multitude of provincial regulations and establishing a multi-million-dollar “clean fuel fund” (Nova Scotia, 2023; Nova Scotia News, 2024b). On the collective side, the province’s plan to phase out coal-fired electricity by 2030 also displays transformative ambition, especially considering that, as recently as 2022, 47% of provincial electricity generation was coal-based (Environment and Natural Resources Canada, 2023).

Strengths and Weaknesses

In 2015, George Monbiot said of the Paris Agreement: “By comparison to what it could have been, it’s a miracle. By comparison to what it should have been, it’s a disaster” (Monbiot, 2015). Almost a decade later, the same could be said of Nova Scotia’s Climate Change Plan. It displays surprising ambition and uses progressive language, yet largely fails to materially confront the deeper structural causes of environmental destruction. To be sure, a world in which the Plan’s commitments are met is vastly preferable to one in which they are not.

However, at a time when radical action is needed, the Plan, like so many others before it, settles instead for a reformed status quo.

The Plan is at its best when it pursues coordinated, transformative, equitable climate action. One example is the government's focus on affordability. Its recent procurements of new wind turbines placed a strict price cap on the electricity that would be generated by the projects so as not to increase ratepayers' energy bills (Smith, 2022). As well, it administers programs such as HomeWarming and the Mi'kmaw Home Energy Efficiency Project that provide low-cost or free energy-efficiency retrofits to homes in low-income and equity-deserving communities (HomeWarming, n.d.; Efficiency Nova Scotia, n.d.). In these examples, the government affirms that, in pursuing the goal of a cleaner energy system, free market outcomes are not sacrosanct, and the health of our community should be measured by household sufficiency rather than corporate profits. This mindset also appears to inform Nova Scotia's legally binding plan to phase out coal-generated energy by 2030, a goal that requires shutting down coal plants before the end of their lifetimes, despite the profits that could have been made by keeping them running longer (NS Power, 2022). Other notable collective policy points in the Plan include pursuing the electrification of public transit and funding community-based climate actions such as community bike hubs (HCi3, 2023). The latter is also a cultural action, not only encouraging a modal shift in transportation from cars to bikes, but also promoting a cooperative economy and culture in which individuals, as part of communities, take what they need and offer what they can. What unites and strengthens all these actions is their placement of collective values such as equity and sustainability before any commitment to individual profit or the maximization of economic growth.

Unfortunately, the potency of the collective and cultural actions just described is diminished by the Plan's main weakness: its failure to pursue systemic economic, political, or cultural change. The Plan's overwhelming focus on technological, as opposed to cultural, actions betrays this reluctance most tellingly. By definition, technological climate actions do not require individuals and systems to change how they relate to each other or the environment (McAllister et al., 2014). In the imagination of political leaders, new technologies will defuse any threat posed by climate change (or its resolution) to the current balance of power in society. Read through this lens, the Plan's reliance on technological solutions implies that its deepest commitment is ultimately to uphold the status quo.

One can clearly see this tendency when imagining what Nova Scotia might look like in, say, twenty years, based on the contents of the Plan. Individual lives and the organization of economic activity would be much the same, just with different technologies. Families would still live in large houses in suburban neighbourhoods with multiple cars—but the cars would be electric or hydrogen-powered, and the house would be efficiently heated and insulated. Production would largely be done by private businesses primarily oriented to making profits for their owners—but with “greener” products and services, such as bioplastics, hydrogen-powered delivery vehicles, and electric tractors. Electricity use would continue to grow—but it would be mostly or completely generated by sun, wind, and water. Consumerism would continue unabated—but more consumer products would be made with recycled or “biological” materials. In the Plan’s imagined future, the ideal climate action is one that is hardly noticeable, posing as little disruption to our consumer capitalist society as possible. As Tim Bousquet (2024) notes in the Halifax Examiner, “The province has sold us this [idea] that we can address climate change without making any substantial changes in the way we lead our lives.”

The main problem with this approach is that a climate action plan cannot be founded on inaction. The Plan’s fantasy of clean, undisruptive technological solutions rests upon various inaccurate assumptions and unjust value choices. For example, the Plan’s emissions accounting is disingenuous as it only counts emissions released within the province’s physical borders. It should be noted that this accounting method is a global standard; thus, the government should not be held uniquely responsible for choosing it. Nonetheless, the result of this choice is that the out-of-province emissions required to manufacture electric vehicles that the Plan envisages Nova Scotians driving—emissions greater, in fact, than those required for conventional vehicles (Morgan, 2020)—are simply ignored. The same is done with the “embodied emissions” of all other material goods, such as the wind turbines and heat pumps so essential to the Plan. If the emissions involved in producing and shipping “zero-emissions” technologies were factored into provincial accounting, it would become clear that the sheer amount of consumption is just as problematic as the types of materials and services being consumed. Whether our cars are gas-powered or electric, we need fewer, smaller cars on the roads. Whether our energy comes from coal or wind, we need to use less. There is no silver bullet technology that will make infinite economic growth sustainable on a finite

planet, and certainly not within the timeline needed to properly address the climate crisis. Yet, in the Plan, growth is beyond question, and the transition to an ecologically sustainable society, a goal more realistically, if not exclusively, accomplishable by rejecting eternal growth, plays second fiddle to this tired imperative of capitalism. In this sense, the most telling word in Nova Scotia's Climate Change Plan for Clean Growth is the last one: growth. The logic of growth, rather than that of true sustainability, is the skeleton upon which the meat of its policies is anchored. This is an extremely troubling, if somewhat unsurprising, lapse in practical and ethical judgement. Our alternative approach to climate action in Nova Scotia would start from a place of replacing the centrality of growth with a deep commitment to cooperative and ecologically informed values.

Recommendations

Commit to the Principles

As noted previously, the Plan outlines the ethical principles upon which it (and the EGCCRA of 2021) is supposedly based before presenting its 68 policy actions. These four principles are: Netukulimk, sustainable development, equity, and a circular economy. Arguably, a circular economy, which the Plan describes as a consumer economy that maximizes the longevity and use-value of extracted resources and manufactured goods while minimizing waste, is not a higher-level moral commitment but a derivative principle stemming from the commitment to sustainable development. This leaves three moral principles—Netukulimk, sustainable development, and equity—that can be evaluated based on their worthiness as moral goals and the extent to which the Plan's contents are consistent with them.

The Plan's principles are worthy goals, but our analysis finds that its contents are inconsistent with rigorous, good-faith definitions of these principles. The basic problem is that the Plan's overriding "green growth" commitments contradict any practically grounded interpretation of the principles. For example, at its core, the Mi'kmaw concept of Netukulimk is a way of being in the world that is based on taking only what one needs and no more, on equality among humans and nonhumans, and on the discouragement of wealth accumulation ("Netukulimk", 2020; Baxter, 2020). Both in Canadian law and the Mi'kmaw tradition, participants in Mi'kmaw "Netukulimk Livelihood Fisheries" are not allowed to use their catch for wealth accumulation (Potlotek First Nation, 2020; McMillan & Prosper, 2016). Meanwhile,

the Plan encourages precisely the opposite. For example, it invests much in hydrogen fuel developments that, far from being an effective decarbonization strategy, will produce little social benefit other than short-term profits for relevant corporate owners and investors (Baxter, 2023). The fundamental problem is that profit maximization has little to no place in an economy governed by Netukulimk, yet the Plan invokes this principle in its promotion of carbon sequestration markets, private procurement models, private hydrogen-fuel developments, and investment in the “clean economy.” The government’s claim that these actions are based on Netukulimk is inaccurate and culturally insensitive.

The Plan’s other two moral principles are similarly at odds with many of the Plan’s actions. Robust interpretations of sustainable development explicitly reject the conventional logic of economic development that views growth as necessary to human well-being (Beckerman, 1994; Leichtweis, 2023). However, as our analysis shows, the Plan’s focus on technological climate actions, not to mention its very title, indicates a refusal to challenge this logic of growth. Finally, on the principle of equity, it must be noted that inequity is a fundamental dynamic of the capitalist economic system that the Plan strives to maintain, in that this system tends toward concentrating wealth in fewer and fewer hands (Johansen et al., 1969; Rehbein, 2020). In these ways, the Plan’s commitment to a future of growth under capitalism prevents it from adhering to its own stated principles.

At a time when “green growth” approaches to climate action appear increasingly unfruitful (Hickel & Kallis, 2019), the fact that the Plan’s principles are in tension with a capitalist economy is a strength, not a weakness. The inconsistency between the Plan’s principles and actions should be fixed by bringing its contents in line with the principles rather than vice versa. We recommend that, at a fundamental level, the Plan reject its focus on growth under capitalism and reorient its material priorities as expressed in its mitigation-related policy actions. The new focus should be a society and economy that adheres to the values of Netukulimk, sustainable development, and equity. Most of the Plan’s collective actions, such as its renewable overhaul of the energy grid, could be easily translated to this framework since they are already largely independent of the market. More proactively, however, this change would also require the democratization of Nova Scotia

Power (a process started, but not completed, by the recent Energy Reform Act (Nova Scotia News, 2024a) to remove its incentive to generate ever-increasing profits and growth for its executives and shareholders (Majka, 2012)). Otherwise, the efficiency gains from the Plan's ambitious investments in renewable technologies risk being nullified to the extent that NSP pursues compounded growth in consumption (Majka, 2012). Meanwhile, many of the Plan's individual actions, which largely focus on profit-driven market behaviours, could be eliminated where they are counterproductive to the goal of emissions reduction, as is arguably the case with hydrogen-fuel megadevelopments (Baxter, 2023). Others could be modified to accomplish the same goal—retrofitting rental housing, for example—with less of a focus on profit.

Scale up Successes

Despite the Plan's shortcomings, it does contain several actions that pursue the kind of holistic cultural and infrastructural changes that Nova Scotia needs—certainly a reason for celebration. However, to be truly transformative, these must be scaled up.

Many of these actions can be found in the subsection of the Plan focusing on supporting local climate actions. For example, the provincial government invested \$7.5 million into the Halifax Climate Investment, Innovation and Impact fund (Nova Scotia, 2023). Among the grant recipients were projects such as the Ecology Action Centre's Pop-up Bike Hub (HCi3, 2023), a trailer that travels around Halifax to provide free bike repairs and education. Its excursions focus on communities—often of colour—overlooked by commercial bike shops and by active transportation advocacy. In doing so, it helps make cycling culture, and its attendant climate benefits, accessible to people outside of wealthier neighbourhoods where bike shops are profitable and residents have more resources to advocate for better infrastructure. This type of program could be scaled up by establishing similar public bike resource centres in other communities across the province; only then would it be reasonable to expect a noticeable culture shift toward everyday cycling.

Other inspiring but undersized actions can be found in the subsection of the Plan entitled "creating cleaner transportation options". In this subsection, the government commits to expanding access to "community transit" in rural areas, creating an active transportation strategy, and reducing single-person vehicle trips. As already discussed, however, these

actions have not received the amount of funding needed to provide convenient, affordable and geographically extensive alternatives to driving. Instead of half-measures—a bike lane here, an extra bus there—an overhaul of the currently car-centric provincial transportation system is needed. For example, Maritime provincial governments already acknowledge that the Maritime Bus inter-community bus network is an essential service (Webb, 2022). The service should be expanded to currently unserved areas, such as Nova Scotia’s South, Acadian, and Eastern Shores (Maritime Bus, n.d.), and on most routes, service frequencies should be increased from once a day to at least three or four times a day, as was the norm 100 years ago in Nova Scotia’s railroad era (Graham et al., 1929). If such a service were unprofitable for Maritime Bus to maintain, then the Maritime governments should either subsidize or take ownership of the service, as is their approach with the provincial highway networks. Meanwhile, development permits could require walkable and bikeable communities throughout the province – for example, Saanich, BC, has a new Subdivision Bylaw stating that all new roads must have sidewalks on at least one side (Saanich, 2018).

A sustainability culture shift, of course, must encompass more than just transportation. Fundamentally, cooperation, creativity, and care must replace short-sighted materialism and accumulation in all arenas of our society. The Plan, currently silent on the critical issue of culture shifts other than some limited proposals for transportation, must expand its scope to ignite culture shifts in other domains, such as housing, material consumption, food systems, and more. In every domain, it must hold the wealthy accountable for their oversized ecological impacts, promote the sharing of resources, and celebrate sufficiency and non-consumptive values. Aside from mitigating GHGs, such shifts will also create a more resilient and interdependent society that is better able to provide for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged.

Involve All Levels and Sectors of Government

A climate plan cannot be put in a separate “box” while economic development, legislation, regulation, and other government initiatives continue as if the climate crisis did not exist. The Nova Scotian government has itself acknowledged the importance of factoring the environment into all decision-making in the EGCCRA, which legislates that “[t]he long-term objective of the

Government is to achieve sustainable prosperity” (Environmental Goals and Climate Change Reduction Act, 2021). However, as is often the case in environmental policy, “sustainable prosperity” is defined so broadly in the EGCCRA that it does not impose any meaningful constraints on conventional economic development. Hence, the government continues to make decisions that are clearly unsustainable in any meaningful sense. For example, it plans to spend \$583 million from 2025–2030 on road projects, mostly highway twinning (Thomas, 2023). If the principles of the Plan applied to all provincial actions, such twinning projects, which are meant to enable more car travel (Nova Scotia Department of Public Works, 2021), would obviously be unjustifiable. It is well known that widening highways simply incentivises more people to drive, eliminating any initial time savings and adding more GHG-emitting cars to the roads (Speck, 2018). Nor are they justifiable in the name of road safety, which can be achieved by lowering speed limits and/or offering safe mass transit services instead of twinning (Hughes & Husain, 2000).

Similarly, the government does not seem to be integrating climate action with its plan for population growth (Willick, 2023). This is an unfortunate oversight, as its two long-term goals—doubling population by 2060 and net-zero emissions by 2050—could be complementary if done thoughtfully, yet also have the potential to interfere with each other if caution is not taken. To properly integrate these two goals, the new communities, infrastructure, programs and services that will need to be built to accommodate these newcomers must be sustainable. The fact that many of these communities would be built from scratch allows for a high degree of sustainable innovation that neither the Plan nor the population growth strategy fully acknowledges. While existing communities are limited by current infrastructure and entrenched behavioural patterns, new communities could be visionary experiments in cooperative living, sustainable transportation, and holistic health and well-being—but only if the province starts planning for this reality. For inspiration, Nova Scotian planners and communities could look to the Treehouse Village Ecohousing project in Bridgewater (Rent, 2023), or, further afield, to new tiny house developments and “low car(bon)” neighbourhoods such as GWL Terrein in the Netherlands (Jonker, 2019; Foletta & Field, 2011).

A third area that could benefit from integration is local climate action. All Nova Scotian municipalities were required to create Municipal Climate Change Action Plans (MCCAPs) by the end of 2013 to receive federal gas tax funding (Service Nova Scotia and Municipal

Relations, 2011). Though the Plan makes some attempt to fund municipal climate actions, it does not reference the MCCAPs or call for their updating. This is surprising, given how much the climate crisis has progressed in the past decade. Unifying the provincial Plan with the MCCAPs would make climate action in Nova Scotia more thorough, coordinated, and secure.

Lastly, other areas of climate policy integration could include educational curricula that focus on the Plan's stated values, food and agriculture policies that encourage ecological farming methods, and consumer product regulations to combat planned obsolescence. As already noted, the government already has a legal framework in the EGCCRA for this integration; it should now bring the spirit of its commitment to fruition by adjusting the definition of "sustainable prosperity" to impose meaningful constraints on conventional economic development. As a start, the reference to economic growth in the definition must be removed, and the meaning of "prosperity" clarified, ideally in a way that prioritizes human and non-human flourishing over shallow economic indicators such as GDP. Strengthening this framework of integration will better enable the government to lead all Nova Scotians to a successful ecological transition.

Jara de Hoog graduated from Acadia University in 2024 with a Bachelor of Science with Honours in Environmental Science. Her academic and professional work challenges the conventional divide between "ecological" and "non-ecological" issues. In her free time, she enjoys biking, foraging, and reading.

Alice Cohen is a Professor in the departments of Earth & Environmental Science and Environmental & Sustainability studies at Acadia University. Her research focuses on environmental governance, with a particular emphasis on water governance in Canada. She is the co-author (with Andrew Biro) of *Organizing Nature: Turning Canada's Ecosystems into Resources* (University of Toronto Press, 2023).

Andrew Biro is a Professor in the Politics department at Acadia University. He is also a CCPA-NS Research Associate and member of the Research Advisory Committee. His research and teaching interests are at the intersections of environmental politics, political economy, critical theory, and cultural studies. He is the co-author (with Alice Cohen) of *Organizing Nature: Turning Canada's Ecosystems into Resources* (University of Toronto Press, 2023).

The CCPA-NS office is located in K'jipuktuk in Mi'kma'ki, the unceded, unsurrendered ancestral land of the Mi'kmaq people. We recognize that we are all treaty people and have responsibilities to each other and this land.

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