

# **STOPPING THE SPRAWL**

**How Winnipeg Could Benefit from Metropolitan  
Growth Management Strategies for a Slow-  
Growth Region**

**by**

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The adoption of measures designed to counter urban sprawl, i.e. to achieve more compact growth across urban regions, is becoming an increasingly common phenomenon in North American cities, and is referred to as “smart growth” or “metropolitan growth management” (MGM). For the most part, however, such measures have been adopted in areas affected by rapid population growth and there is a widespread conception that they are most appropriate to rapid growth. This paper argues that sprawl development is potentially far more damaging to slowly growing cities than rapidly growing ones, and that metropolitan growth management is therefore highly appropriate to a slow-growth situation.

Examining the case of Winnipeg, the paper considers the problems and possibilities that are likely to be encountered in any attempt to manage this slowly growing urban region’s growth, and produces a set of recommendations designed to take advantage of the opportunities and overcome the difficulties.

Among the highlights of the recommendations are the following:

- The scope and impact of a meaningful set of MGM measures necessitate

extensive citizen participation.

- A growth boundary designed to set off areas of future urban development from agricultural areas would be an important feature of MGM, but Winnipeg’s slow growth requires the boundary to take an unconventional physical form — the form of an “archipelago” rather than an “island.”
- A series of disincentives to sprawl development, combined with incentives for more compact growth would constitute a critical support for MGM.

Other important supports would be:

- Combined transportation and land use measures designed to bolster the transit system;
- Inner city revitalization and housing measures; and
- Social initiatives aimed especially at the inner city.

The paper concludes that, although metropolitan growth management would not be easy to achieve in Winnipeg, it is both urgently needed and possible.



# STOPPING THE SPRAWL

## How Winnipeg Could Benefit from Metropolitan Growth Management Strategies for a Slow-Growth Region

**W**innipeg faces a growth dilemma. A city of more than 600,000, with the highest residential property taxes in western Canada, and the third highest in the country, it is surrounded by semi-rural municipalities with substantially lower tax rates and faster growth rates. A growing number of home buyers are opting for lower taxes within easy commuting distance of the city. High taxes, in turn, restrict the resources available for coping with the other horn of the growth dilemma: neighbourhood decline, housing abandonment, and deteriorating infrastructure, especially in the inner city.

In many American metropolitan areas, attempts are being made to work toward long term solutions to such growth problems through metropolitan growth management (MGM): managing urban growth in such a way as to increase urban densities, promote more mixed land uses, and limit sprawl. A perceived obstacle to MGM in the Winnipeg area is that Winnipeg is a region of relatively slow growth. This raises the question of how growth can be directed toward desirable ends, when there is little growth to manage. In this paper, we begin by making a case for a broad, regional policy such as MGM to deal with urban

problems in the Winnipeg area. Next we examine common elements of MGM as it has been applied elsewhere in North America, noting the difficulties inherent in applying such a policy to a slow-growth metropolitan area.

Finally, we consider ways of making such a policy more practical for the Winnipeg area. Our point of departure is a recognition that, at present, both public and political support for MGM are weak in Manitoba, though there is a widespread awareness of growth problems. We are not implying that MGM is imminent in Winnipeg, only exploring avenues for getting there. It is our belief, however, that the case for MGM in a slowly growing city is substantially stronger than it is generally considered to be. Indeed, as we argue in the section entitled "Urban Decline in Winnipeg," the need for MGM is, if anything, more urgent in a slowly growing city than in one that is growing rapidly. A case study of Winnipeg can be a useful starting-point in considering the wider question of whether MGM is desirable and achievable in slowly growing cities. Our objective is a set of recommendations for the formulation and implementation of MGM in Winnipeg, drawing on experience with MGM in other jurisdictions.

# TYPICAL URBAN DECLINE

Over the past twenty years, much of the literature on urban decline (Bradbury, Downs, & Small, 1982; Downs, 1994; Orfield, 1997) has argued that unmanaged urban sprawl results in a number of problems throughout the metropolitan region. The process of urban sprawl is associated with the exodus of the middle class from much of the inner city and older suburbs which may, as a result, contain a high concentration of poverty (Downs 47-49). Poor neighbourhoods, in turn, tend to experience serious social problems, including significant losses in population, social isolation, unemployment, ineffective schools, crime, and erosion of housing stock and infrastructure (Downs, 79-83; Orfield, 2-4; Yeates 1995, 222-3). These social problems create a great demand for increased services, which the city is hard pressed to meet due to the financial strains already put on city coffers by suburban infrastructure costs (Downs 77-8; Orfield, 5-8). The net result is high taxes for the suburbs and inadequate services to meet the social needs of the inner city. Although there are often other causes of high taxes, service cutbacks, and social problems, we argue that uncontrolled urban sprawl worsens these problems significantly.

While the roots of suburbanization in Canada date back largely to the early postwar years, following changes in the system of home finance (Harris 1991, 56-7; Sewell 1994, 12-14), today it is fuelled very often by a desire for segregation from people of lower income, of a lower class, or of a different ethnicity (Bradbury, Downs, and Small 1982, 74-6). As a result, over time, suburbanization has the effect of geographically separating groups by income, race, or class (Downs 1994, 9-10).

Goldberg and Mercer (1986, 45-7) have argued that Canadian cities are different in this respect from American cities, which have a long history of racial conflict and discrimination. While this may be true, Canadian cities may be changing. Winnipeg, for example, has seen a recent and large influx of aboriginal migrants, many of whom have settled in the inner city, who make up the majority of the population in some inner-city areas, and who are disproportionately dependent on social services (Driedger 1995; Goldberg and Mercer, 47; Ley 1991, 326; Nairne 1998; Stewart 1993, 154). These areas may yet come to resemble U.S. ghetto neighborhoods. In sum, segregation involves the concentration of the poor within the older, inner city.

The literature points to urban problems which occur following the segregation of poverty. (Massey and Denton, 1993; Jencks and Peterson, 1991; Mincy and

Wiener, 1993; Marcuse, 1997; 1997a; Van Kempen, Eva T, 1997) Orfield (2-5) has argued that this, due to the physical separation from jobs and the lack of middle class role models, reinforces welfare dependency and leads to higher crime rates. For example, a high concentration of adolescents from troubled or impoverished families may lead to the formation of street gangs. Students who have intelligence and potential, but who live within these troubled neighbourhoods, may be co-opted into gangs if they have few other role models. Hence, the greater the concentration of poverty and social problems, the more intense those problems will become. As this occurs, the exodus of middle class residents, who fear the crime and social problems in the inner city, becomes greater, thereby perpetuating the cycle.

Suburbanization in itself is not an “evil,” providing it can be sustained. Perhaps the most severe consequence of most urban sprawl is that it has been at very low densities. Low densities, stemming from inefficient land use, result in a high amount of infrastructure and services per taxpayer and, hence, higher city expenses per tax dollar (Orfield, 86). These added infrastructure and service expenses, combined with the added social service costs in the inner city, inevitably result in higher property taxes and service cutbacks. (Harris and Scarth, 1999) And since suburban residents typically pay higher taxes and have greater re-

sources with which to pressure the city government, it is usually services most beneficial to the inner city that are cut first and to the greatest degree. This decline in services to the inner city, particularly when its residents require them the most, only further aggravates already existing social problems and, as a result, suburbanization.

These problems tend to be much worse in American cities, where fractured tax bases result in greater fiscal disparities, further encourage sprawl, and can result in a loss of tax base for the metropolitan region as a whole (Orfield, 86-7), but the symptoms are evident in Winnipeg and other Canadian cities as well.

The expansion of low density suburbs has, in part, been fuelled by the increase in automobile ownership, which allows individuals to live farther from their workplaces and from shopping areas. Widespread automobile ownership also made spatial separation of commercial, residential, and industrial areas feasible (Yeates 1998, 201). Residence or employment in use-separated suburban areas, in turn, mandates automobile owner-

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ship. Thus the automobile, which began as a convenience that enabled separation of uses, in the end became a necessity for anyone living or working in suburban areas. The separation of uses at low densities and the increase of automobile usage has increased traffic congestion, air pollution, and road usage, which results in increased road maintenance and building costs for the city.

The viability of public transit is weakened due both to the increased automobile usage and to the low population density in suburban areas (Downs, 7-9; Yeates, 214-5; Pucher 1998, 26). A viable public transit system serves a number of important purposes. In the first place, residents who do not own a vehicle depend on transit to travel to work, school, or other destinations. It is essential, also, for those who are not employed and who do not drive to be able to conduct effec-

tive job searches. Secondly, increased public transit usage will have to be a part of any successful campaign to reduce automobile usage and, hence, significantly lower pollution levels and lower road and bridge construction and maintenance costs. A third reason is that increased transit use would lead to reduced traffic congestion.

While conventional suburban development has severe consequences for cities, the consequences of exurban growth are worse. Exurban growth refers to the growth of residential communities outside of the central city's boundaries, driven possibly by the high taxes already referred to, a desire for living in a country setting, or a desire to escape perceived problems of the city. Exurban growth involves an erosion of the tax base of the central city, further worsening its financial difficulties. Exurban resi-

**Table 1: Hectares consumed per thousand population change 1966-86**

<b>CMA</b>	<b>Rate of land consumption</b>
<b>Toronto</b>	27
<b>Vancouver</b>	34
<b>Montreal</b>	35
<b>Calgary</b>	43
<b>Ottawa-Hull</b>	47
<b>Quebec</b>	51
<b>Edmonton</b>	59
<b>Winnipeg</b>	95

Source: Patterson, 1998, 761.

**Table 2: Population density changes in urbanized portions of selected CMAs**

CMA	Mean population density, urbanized tracts		Per cent of population in urbanized tracts
	1996	Change 1971-96	
Toronto	3,329	-4.43%	80.2
Montreal	3,255	-23.21%	77.6
Ottawa-Hull	2,478	8.84%	72.5
Vancouver	2,377	20.27%	78.1
Winnipeg	2,375	-16.96%	83.0
Hamilton	2,288	-7.86%	82.2
Edmonton	2,165	-13.45%	73.4
Quebec	1,962	-14.54%	69.6
Calgary	1,916	-4.26%	78.8

Source: Bunting, Filion and Priston, 2000.

**Table 3: Inner city population and density changes**

CMA	Inner-city density change 1971-96 (%)	Inner-city population change 1971-96 (%)
Vancouver	15.20	18.5
Calgary	-1.92	-1.92
Toronto	-10.31	-10.67
Edmonton	-15.96	-15.96
Ottawa-Hull	-22.23	-22.51
Hamilton	-26.84	-20.23
Winnipeg	-27.59	-23.25
Montreal	-31.10	-35.34
Quebec	-35.74	-35.45

Source: Bunting, Filion and Priston, 2000.

dents no longer pay residential property taxes to the city, but, in Canada at least, they typically remain oriented to the city, often work there, and enjoy many of its amenities, without having to help pay for city infrastructure, policing, social services and other services. Many exurban municipalities are largely composed of middle class to wealthy residents, a situation which is maintained

by local zoning requirements that exclude smaller, multifamily, and subsidized housing. Hence, exurban municipalities frequently have lower social service costs and little need for higher taxes.

# URBAN DECLINE IN WINNIPEG

While sprawl in the Winnipeg region is not comparable to that in many American cities (Goldberg and Mercer 1986), it has clearly taken a toll. Three separate measures of sprawl — hectares consumed per thousand population change, density changes in urbanized portions of the CMA\* and density changes in the inner city — are suggestive of what is happening (see Tables 1-3). Of these three measures, it is probably hectares consumed per thousand population change (Table 1) that is the most significant. The drawback of the figure for density changes in urbanized portions of the Winnipeg CMA (Table 2) is the hedge “urbanized portions,” which exclude the earliest stages of fringe development.

Indeed, as Table 2 shows, the figure for Winnipeg excludes 17 per cent of the population of the CMA. Undoubtedly some commercial farmers, who are genuinely part of a rural economy, are among those excluded, but so, in all likelihood, are the “sprawl pioneers”: hobby farmers, homes strung out along major roads and relatively isolated residents of future suburbs. Table 1, by contrast, covers the entire CMA, and takes in those areas actually converted to urban use, as measured by remote sensing. (Patterson

1993) Even this measure will fail to capture some of the more scattered urban residences in otherwise rural areas. In addition, the figures in Table 1 are somewhat dated, but, if anything, that would suggest that the table understates the problem. Other evidence, cited below, makes it clear that the situation has worsened since 1986.

As for the inner city population changes (Table 3), these figures, taken by themselves, could signify the density reductions that often accompany gentrification — a state of affairs that exists in substantial parts of Toronto’s inner city and in more scattered portions of inner cities elsewhere in Canada — or they could indicate serious social and economic decline. Other evidence, cited below, clearly shows that, in Winnipeg, the latter cause is the predominant one. On any interpretation, the three tables, taken together, show that sprawl in the Winnipeg region is at least substantial and at most the worst in Canada. In loss of inner city population, Winnipeg also ranks near the bottom of Canadian cities.

However, the information in these tables, gleaned from a comparative analysis of several cities, is less revealing than a demographic comparison of the central city with fringe municipalities, as well as evidence of social and physical changes visible at street level and invisible underground. The central city, with

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\* The equivalent of an American MSA.

a 1996 population of 611,630, is surrounded by a ring of urbanizing rural areas and rapidly growing small towns. The outer ring, with a population of 71,445, remains thinly populated, but in recent years it has been taking a dramatically disproportionate share of the new population growth, even though the city still has large areas of developable land.

Population growth within the city was 3.7 per cent from 1986 to 1991 and 0.3 per cent over the next five years, while exurban growth took off, with municipalities bordering the city growing at rates in excess of ten per cent over five years, and in some instances more than 20 per cent. (Lezubski, 1999) The inner city, meanwhile, has been caught up in long-term population decline, losing one-quarter of its population between 1966 and 1996. (Silver, Lezubski and Black, 1999, 4)

Even more unmistakable is the evidence of physical decay and social distress. The deterioration of the inner city's older infrastructure becomes most dramatically visible when an automobile or truck plunges through a hole that suddenly opens up in the street. This has occurred several times in recent years, thanks to deteriorating sewer lines (Redekop 1996; Wild 1994). The streets and houses of the inner city are deteriorating less spectacularly, but possibly even faster. Despite heroic efforts on the part of all three levels of government and the local business community, once-bus-

ting Portage Avenue is a problem area, and Selkirk Street, the former commercial heart of the North End, is moribund. Unoccupied retail premises are a common sight on Portage and are virtually ubiquitous on Selkirk.

In inner-city residential neighbourhoods, housing has deteriorated dramatically, and boarded-up residences are becoming an increasingly common sight in some of the worst neighbourhoods. Some neighbourhoods are beset by gangs and arson has become a favourite street sport. Much of the inner city has been red-lined by insurance companies, with the result that home owners applying for insurance may be refused, or may be required to pay more than the standard premium.

Such decline is a lamentably common phenomenon in North America, but its specific impact on any given city varies according to local circumstances. Winnipeg's decline has been shaped by the fact that it is a slow-growth city. Anthony Downs (1994, 67) defines slowly growing cities as those that had population gains of under ten per cent over ten years. From 1986 to 1996, the population gain of the CMA of Winnipeg from 625, 304 to 667, 209 reflects a 6.7 per cent increase (Leo 1998; Manitoba and Winnipeg 1996).

An important difference between the urban decline found in a slow-growth city and that found in a rapidly grow-

ing city is depopulation of the inner city (Bradbury, Downs, and Small 1982, 174). As upwardly mobile residents continue to move out of the inner city, there is no incoming population to replace those leaving. This leads to a situation of housing abandonment and an ever-increasing concentration of residents unable to upgrade their housing. Recent City of Winnipeg area studies elaborate the findings set out on Table 3 by showing declining population levels in many inner city neighbourhoods as well as proportions of housing in need of major repair in the ten to twenty percent range (City of Winnipeg Planning Department 1991, 1993).

A second characteristic of urban decline in a slow-growth city is the decline of its commercial core. In cities undergoing economic decline or limited growth, there is relatively little new investment in the downtown area to offset the decline and suburbanization of its commercial aspects. In rapidly growing cities, on the other hand, there may be sufficient investment in the downtown to spur expansion that swallows up adjacent decayed residential areas. Winnipeg has clearly suffered a dramatic decline in its downtown, as evidenced by high rates of vacancy, building and infrastructure deterioration, and store closures (*Manitoba Business* 1993).

All of these empty spaces are still served by infrastructure, but they lack taxpayers to help pay for it. Empty spaces

served by infrastructure that are not covered off by revenue are also in evidence in the fringe areas of a slowly growing city. If a metropolitan area is growing rapidly, empty spaces created by “leap-frog” development at the edge of the metropolitan area are likely to be filled in relatively quickly with taxpayers to help support the infrastructure. In a slowly growing city, taxpayer support for overextended infrastructure is likely to grow more slowly.

These added impacts of sprawl development upon slowly growing cities have not been given the attention they deserve in the MGM literature, which, in distinguishing between the effects of slow and rapid growth, has generally limited itself to the observation that anti-sprawl measures will take effect more slowly where “growth pressures are weak” (Downs 1994, 152), leaving the impression that MGM is unlikely to be worthwhile in a situation of slow growth. Such formulations are echoed in local political arenas, where fears of loss of growth often become the overriding policy consideration and preclude any serious discussion of MGM. Many have concluded that it does not pay to undertake measures promoting denser development in such cities as Winnipeg. However, if we address costs instead of benefits — and take into consideration the fact that empty spaces created by decay or leap-frog development are being filled slowly or not at all — we would be likely to con-

clude that densification is much more urgent in slowly growing cities than it is in rapidly growing ones. (Leo and Brown, 2000)

In Winnipeg, the problems of depopulation, decline of housing stock, deterioration of downtown, and growing social problems were major impetuses for the establishment in 1981 of the Core Area Initiative, a massive urban revitalization program funded by all three levels of government (Stewart 1993). Though the program directed over \$200 million in public funds, in addition to private money, to Winnipeg's core from 1981 to 1992 to combat these problems, its success was limited due to the persistence, stubbornness, and geographical extent of those problems (Dexter and Kowall 1990, iii; Stewart 159-160). Furthermore, it was not accompanied by measures designed to address long term urban decline; core area problems were alleviated without adequate reference to suburban and exurban expansion, a major factor in the severity of Winnipeg's inner city decline. The CAI was akin to pouring water into a leaky bucket without first patching the leaks.

The crucial question for Winnipeg then is how might it go about patching its "leaks"? If suburban and exurban expansion were to be limited or redirected, then it would be much easier and much more effective to revitalize the inner city and to ameliorate the conditions of many

of its residents. The most successful and viable measure would likely be one that does not restrict growth, but rather manages growth and, if possible, redirects it toward declining neighbourhoods. This would require substantial government involvement and leadership, extensive co-operation between different levels of government, business, and city residents, and a wide-ranging metropolitan area focus.

Programs along these lines, which appear to be gaining ground, both in policy and in the academic literature (Blais, 1995; DeGrove with Miness, 1992; Downs, 1994; Knaap and Nelson, 1992; Leo 1998; Leo et al 1998; Leonard, 1983), are variously referred to as "smart growth" or regional or metropolitan growth management (MGM). In general, MGM involves the establishment of a comprehensive and regional framework or plan to manage urban growth in a

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rational manner, taking into account residential densities, the costs of infrastructure, transportation, environmental concerns, preservation of agricultural land, and affordable housing (DeGrove with Miness 1992, 2-3; Leo 1998). The most noted and, perhaps, most successful example of MGM in North America has been in Oregon, though a number of other states have also adopted some form or certain elements of MGM.

In order to examine the appropriateness of metropolitan growth management for the Winnipeg area, it is first important to describe its elements as found elsewhere, then describe if or how these elements might be reproduced in the context of Winnipeg. It should be noted that any plan meant to address the problems of Winnipeg, even if based on one applied elsewhere first, would have to be suited to Winnipeg's own unique situation and needs. The described elements of MGM are, for the most part, taken from Portland, since that appears to be the most successful case in North America. Furthermore, regional urban planning has thirty years of history in Oregon upon which it can be judged. However, lessons based on other examples of state plans, which have had varying degrees of effectiveness and success, do exist and some references are made to those.

## POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

### Perceived need and leadership

For MGM to exist, there must first be a perceived need to manage urban growth. In Oregon's case, there was a strong environmental consciousness based particularly on the desire to save agricultural, forest, and coastal land from the rapidly expanding city (Howe, 1993, 61-2; Leo *et al* 1998). With a strong perceived need, it became possible to form a political coalition based on this issue, to raise public awareness and support, and to pass the legislation designed to meet land preservation goals. As was apparent in Oregon, not only was perceived need required to put the appropriate plan into action, but leadership was also essential, as evidenced by that provided by Governor Tom McCall (Leo 1998).

Florida's growth management program also benefited from appropriate leadership (Starnes 1993, 78). The perceived need for growth management arose following several major development projects throughout urban Florida, including military investment, the building of Walt Disney World, Cape Canaveral space port development, and the construction of a major airport. These developments were widely considered

important to the whole region, but following numerous land use disputes, transportation problems and a drought, concern about the impact of unplanned growth prompted Governor Askew in 1971 to direct a citizen assembly and a task force to begin a process whereby urban growth in Florida would be better managed.

A sharp and obvious difference between urban growth in Florida and Oregon, on one hand, and urban growth in the Winnipeg area, on the other, is the speed and magnitude of growth. Clearly, the massive size and speed of growth in both Oregon and Florida raised a stronger state of alarm about the consequences of rampant, uncontrolled urban growth than would likely arise in Manitoba. Secondly, among all of the American states that have adopted some form of MGM between 1970 and 1992, all were either on the east or the west coast (DeGrove 1992, 7). Perhaps the perceived beauty and fragility of coastal ecosystems has been an important factor in creating a perceived need for growth management; after all, environmental concerns have been prominent in the development of most state growth management plans (DeGrove 1992).

The Winnipeg metropolitan area is neither rapidly growing, nor is there an apparent large-scale fear of the environmental consequences of urban growth. Therefore, there appears to be little perceived need for a metropolitan growth

management plan. This is because the public has, in general, not associated many of our urban problems with uncontrolled growth. People are, however, concerned about the decline of the inner city, and about crime, high taxes, and deterioration of infrastructure. Political leadership that links these issues with metropolitan growth problems might succeed in generating public support for MGM. Since the city of Winnipeg cannot control regional growth on its own, action would have to be taken, at least in part, by the provincial government.

The assertion of provincial political authority over municipal government would not be a new departure in Canadian politics. In contrast to the American “home rule” tradition, it has always been accepted in Canadian politics — though not always gladly — that provincial government has full authority to intervene in municipal affairs in any way that it sees fit and can justify to its supporters. Oregon’s MGM system, in which a state board has the authority to disallow municipal plans, is, in the American context, a remarkable exercise of state power over local government. In Canada, such intrusions are routinely carried out by provincial municipal boards, and they are far from the most severe provincial interventions in local affairs. Recently, for example, the government of Ontario, ignoring strong local resistance, abolished the government of Metropolitan Toronto and merged six municipal governments in the region



into the new unitary local government of Toronto.

### **Legitimacy and citizen participation**

Most successful growth management plans allow for substantial citizen participation. The massive scope and impact of MGM simply make this a necessity. Portland's program included a large degree of public consultation, broadly based public education, and popular support as evidenced by four separate voter initiatives (Leo 1998). In Florida, an assembly of citizens was struck to make recommendations and offer suggestions to legislators (Starnes 1993, 78). Hence, government leadership on dealing with urban growth cannot come in the form of the government simply dictating a new policy to the public, but must seek legitimacy through public consultation. This is relatively simple and risk-free for the government and will help coalesce support for MGM; the government can then proceed with recommendations from the public, seeking a middle ground among conflicting recommendations.

A program of consultation with the public should occur in Manitoba; it will, at least, open up a public debate on urban sprawl and growth in Manitoba and, at best, result in a legitimate MGM plan. While the government could proceed with such a plan without major public consultation, the more legitimacy and

popular approval behind MGM, the more likely it is to succeed. This would have to include the government putting a substantial effort and resources toward courting the ideas and suggestions of the public and not just giving the appearance of public consultation as governments sometimes do.

Important political support for such a plan could come from very diverse interests. These might include downtown businesses worried about a declining downtown; inner city and inner suburban residents concerned about dropping property values, poverty, and increased crime; taxpayers seeking greater efficiency in the management of the city; environmentalists looking to limit the city's impact on the environment, and farmers and small townspeople residing near the city seeking to curb its expansion. Input and co-operation from such a cross-section of interests would be both beneficial and necessary during this preliminary period of public consultation.

### **Fears of loss of growth**

An important difference between a rapidly growing urban region and a slow-growth one which often has consequences for the development of MGM is the desperation which exists in a slow-growth climate for continued growth and a fear that gains made by growth will evaporate if that growth is in any way interfered with. This is one important reason why Winnipeg has been will-

ing to accept proposals for growth with few conditions placed on those proposals. Overcoming the fears that MGM will halt growth rather than manage it will not be easy. A public debate on the issue, perhaps opened by the government, might lead to some realization that uncontrolled growth does not bring just benefits, but also costs. Hence, growth management is necessary and, if implemented properly, might not drive away growth but rather improve its net benefit to society.

It is noteworthy that MGM in Oregon was conceived as a means, not of slowing growth, but of promoting it, by helping Oregon to become a more attractive location. (Leo 1998) It is also worth bearing in mind that MGM became established in Oregon, and maintained its popular support, during a recessionary period. At that point at least, MGM was not driven by fear of excessive growth. The Oregon experience, in its early stages at least, suggests that rapid growth is not a necessary condition of popular support for MGM.

# GROWTH MANAGEMENT POLICY

**W**e have established that the considerations involved in the formulation and implementation of MGM are not the same in slowly growing cities as those affecting rapidly growing centres, but they are not all different either. In this section, we undertake a catalogue of some of the most important factors in an MGM policy, considering Winnipeg's situation .

## Statement of goals

MGM is a long-term plan rather than a "quick fix" for a variety of urban ills. Hence, most American states that have adopted MGM in some form have established a set of broad goals their programs are designed to achieve. (Innes 1993, 22). While the statement may include a variety of wide-ranging objectives, having such a statement emphasizes and reminds citizens and legislators what they are trying to accomplish and what the end result should be. This is also important for tailoring the plan to identify what needs and concerns are most crucial for the local region to address. Furthermore, the development of goals offers an ideal forum for public participation in the development of MGM, the importance of which was emphasized

above. The importance of having clearly articulated goals is as great in a slow-growth region as it is in a rapidly growing centre.

Since the primary problem that MGM addresses is excessive low-density development, a major objective must be the achievement of higher densities. That is obvious, but another objective is almost equally important. An overall MGM plan should include policies encouraging a greater mixing of land uses. Mixed uses would, first of all, work well with policies reducing automobile use. This is because they would allow residents to live near their places of work and shopping and, hence, reduce the necessity of having an automobile. Second, mixed uses support higher densities and often more efficient uses of land by permitting such combinations as apartments above stores. Third, areas of mixed uses are more likely to be busy with pedestrian traffic throughout the day, thereby providing a greater sense of personal security (Jacobs 1961). No MGM plan could sweepingly redesign the character of Winnipeg overnight, however elements of MGM and encouraging a greater mixing of uses would be mutually supportive policies.

Credible MGM schemes usually include a wide range of elements, taking in such disparate matters as parks, a variety of environmental concerns, and much more — far more than can be convinc-

ingly covered in a single article. In these pages we concentrate a number of elements that are central to the success of MGM: growth boundaries, taxation measures, incentives for MGM-compatible development, housing and transportation. Our intention is to develop a reasonably convincing core for a programme that would require much further elaboration.

### **Regional governance and agencies**

An important prerequisite for MGM is that it be overseen by an agency or government that has jurisdiction over the entire metropolitan region. Otherwise, each part of the metropolitan area will agree only to proposals which directly benefit their neighbourhoods and will reject any others. NIMBY – “not in my backyard” — is the reason why such a plan must be led by a provincial or state body rather than by a city government, which rarely has jurisdiction over the entire metropolitan area. Fortunately, Canadian cities are, in general, less fractured than their American counterparts, thus reducing disputes, and Canadian provinces, as mentioned previously, can more easily and legitimately become involved in urban affairs (Goldberg and Mercer 1986, 196-8). Hence, establishing MGM in Winnipeg or another Canadian city is easier than it is in the US. This leaves open the question of why there are no major MGM examples in Canada, despite the widespread sprawled nature of Canadian cities. Perhaps Canadian in-

ner cities have not yet declined enough for sufficient alarm to prompt the development of MGM plans.

In addition to having provincial or state enactment of MGM, there must also be an instrument of enforcement, dispute resolution and planning co-ordination. In Portland, this takes the form of those state bodies, the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC), which sets standards and develops policy, the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), which rules on land use matters, and the Department of Land Conservation and Development (DLCD), the state agency that administers the program (Howe 1993, 62-3). In Canada, such functions would normally be performed by the provincial Municipal Board, the Minister of Urban Affairs, or a person or body responsible to the minister. The idea of an exercise of control over city planning, based upon principles laid down in provincial legislation is a familiar feature of Canadian local politics in general and Manitoba politics in particular. The specifics of MGM rules would be relatively novel, but the method of control would not.

### **Local planning and land use control**

It is important to note that MGM does not take away all planning power and ability from local jurisdictions. The experience with MGM, in Oregon and else-

**An effective growth management plan could lead to a serious review and updating of city regulations and zoning bylaws, hence reducing rather than expanding the red tape associated with development proposals.**

where, has been that the state government requires local planning and zoning to be consistent with the overall goals, and uses sanctions or incentives to maintain the co-operation of all mu-

nicipalities subject to the plan (Innes 1993, 22). While MGM should not erase the decision-making power of local governments, it must not, at the opposite extreme, be ineffective and simply create a con-

fusing, multi-layered bureaucracy. Hawaii's state plan has suffered this criticism since it is not legally binding nor was it developed in coordination with the existing land use classification system (Bosselman 1986, 8), and the voluntaristic arrangements in the Lower Mainland of British Columbia (the Vancouver region) are vulnerable to similar objections (Patterson, 1998). An effective growth management plan, which would require local jurisdictions to plan in coordination with plan objectives, could lead to a serious review and updating of city regulations and zoning bylaws, hence reducing rather than expanding the red tape associated with development proposals.

Easing and discarding unnecessary restrictions, following a review of Winnipeg's regulations would also be beneficial for anyone attempting to invest in the city. Many of the restrictions now in force require such things as minimum frontages and road allowances and lead to the patterns of low density residential development that are typical of suburbs. As we argue in more detail below, in the section entitled "Land development and the urban growth boundary" changes in regulations would ease the path to development approvals for neo-traditional developments and other designs that depart from the standard suburban pattern, opening the way for a greater variety of development, including higher densities and more mixed uses. Also beneficial would be a clear, consistent framework and policy whereby developers' proposals are responded to within a reasonable amount of time. For this reason, the regional growth management plan might gain some support among developers and others who are often forced to deal with excessive city regulations. In Portland, straightforward and quick processes for development approval have made it easier for investors to do business (Leo 1998). Robert M. Rhodes (1986, 48), the attorney for one developer, made a similar comment on Florida's Growth Management Act: "State comprehensive plan policies encourage efficient development in areas that have capacity to serve

new population in a timely and orderly manner.” Implementing MGM opens the potential for an updating or discarding of unnecessary regulations, and greater coordination of new regulations, thus countering criticism that MGM necessarily adds another layer of bureaucracy to government and business.

New regulations or policies could be designed to encourage higher residential densities. These would not be radical changes designed to dramatically increase densities, but rather moderate policies to mandate moderate increases in density. As Downs has noted (1994, 150), the mathematics of density are such that the benefits that come with higher density increase at a decreasing rate as one increases density. Hence, increasing densities from low to medium has a greater effect than increasing densities from medium to high. As a result, implementing regulations which raise average residential densities by a moderate amount will go a long way to reducing excessively expensive infrastructure costs by the city and increasing the viability of public transit. At the same time, it still allows for some dwellings of lower and medium density, thereby maintaining choice for the consumer.

The kinds of land use changes needed to implement MGM are essentially the same in slowly and rapidly growing cities, but the impacts would differ. On one hand, slow growth means that it will

take longer for changes in the land use regime to have a noticeable impact on the overall pattern of metropolitan growth. (Downs, 1994) By the same token, the changes that can be achieved may well be more urgently required in a slowly growing centre. As we have observed, sprawl development in a slowly growing city tends to produce infrastructure wealth and revenue poverty: roads and underground municipal services stretching across empty spaces that only slowly fill with revenue-producing development. (Leo and Brown, 2000) In Winnipeg, any measures that promote filling in and more efficient development patterns in place of additional low-density, single-use development at the fringe would come as a welcome measure of relief for a seriously overstretched infrastructure.

### **Land development and the urban growth boundary**

In order to limit unsustainable urban sprawl, MGM plans usually incorporate some sort of urban growth boundary (UGB). Downs (1994, 153-4) explains that these reduce sprawl and infrastructure costs, increase residential densities, and help speed up and make development more predictable. The theory is that a limit on urban sprawl at the fringe of the city will direct urban growth into the central city, potentially reviving declining areas and increasing residential density. Portland established a UGB which

allowed for twenty years' development. (Leo 1998) To be effective, a UGB must be drawn around all urban development in the metropolitan area; anything short of this will lead to exurban or leapfrog development.

Several problems can occur when attempting to establish a UGB (Downs 1994, 127-8). First, it is difficult to establish a boundary to include all developing or developed areas, while excluding undeveloped areas, especially when development is scattered loosely. Secondly, a UGB drawn too tightly makes no room for future development, while one drawn too loosely will have little impact. Thirdly, a UGB may create a land development monopoly within developable areas, thereby driving up land prices. For Winnipeg's case, these difficulties would all have to be taken into consideration.

Setting a strict UGB will be crucial for Winnipeg if MGM is to work. This boundary must be drawn to include all urban areas over the entire metropolitan area of Winnipeg, but should not include too much open space. A boundary line drawn which leaves out urban communities will likely lead to development of those communities at the expense of Winnipeg, while one that is drawn too widely would be ineffective. An urban limit line drawn by *Plan Winnipeg* was found to face both problems (Institute of Urban Studies 1990). Though it attempted to direct urban

growth to older neighbourhoods and to newer suburban areas which could be serviced at reasonable costs to the city, it appeared to simply allow further suburbanization within the city and, in some cases, to drive urban growth to exurban areas.

Winnipeg's slow growth, and the extent to which bedroom communities have spread into the countryside and nearby small towns, call for a different approach here than the one that was used in Portland, where a single growth boundary has been drawn in such a way that the urbanized and urbanizing portions of Metro Portland form a single land mass. If we think of this urbanized mass as an island, a more appropriate form for the urbanized areas of metropolitan Winnipeg would be an archipelago. Numerous small towns around Winnipeg have become, in part, bedroom communities, and numerous newer subdivisions within easy commuting distance are surrounded by farmland or woodland. If this entire area were surrounded by a single growth boundary, it would take generations at present growth rates for the whole area to become urbanized and there would still be communities and other developable areas outside the boundaries that would be within fairly reasonable commuting distance of Winnipeg.

If boundaries are to be effective, they must be drawn around each existing

community, in such a way as to allow for 20 years' growth around each community. The establishment of these boundaries could be combined with a ban on the formation of new communities outside Winnipeg. In order to prevent those communities in which development was permitted from continuing to deprive Winnipeg of growth, their growth could be limited to historical levels — for example an annual growth rate equal to their average annual growth over the past 30 years. Such measures could cause inflation of land prices in outlying communities, but if so, one practical effect would be some erosion in the cost advantages outlying communities now enjoy, thanks to low land prices and taxes that do not have to cover the full range of urban services.

If infill development in Winnipeg is to be made more attractive, disincentives against low-density fringe development within the city would be desirable as well. Currently, development charges on new subdivisions are designed to cover costs to the city in only three areas: roads and bridges, underground municipal services, and parks. When those costs are covered by the developer, the subdivision is deemed to be paying its way and more. As the city spreads outward at ever lower densities, and in patterns that mandate growing auto-dependence, no account is taken of such further costs as maintenance of police and fire response times at lower and lower densities, new

community centres and library branches, costs of providing transit service to subdivisions where even minimal bus service must be heavily subsidized, costs of building new suburban schools while serviceable downtown schools are closed, and so forth. In addition to restrictions on exurban development, there should be increases in development charges for fringe development, so as more nearly to reflect the real costs of servicing these subdivisions. There would, of course, be political opposition to such measures. Among the potential opponents would be developers, real estate people and others in or associated with the land development business; anyone who hopes to profit from land speculation in the urban fringe, including many farmers; anyone who hopes to become an exurban resident in future. Many others would fear land price inflation, or nurture fears of perceived excessive regulation and government interference. Hence, implementing MGM would involve not only coalescing numerous inner city and downtown interests, but it would also involve attempting to bring much of the opposition “on side” with trade-offs, compromise, or, in Stone’s (1987, 1989, 1993) terminology, side payments. It is crucial to the success of MGM, therefore, that it include incentives as well as disincentives.

Where might incentives be found? For starters, it is worth noting that some



exurbanites have already begun to resist further development on the grounds that they are in danger of losing the natural surroundings which were a prime motivation for moving to an exurban loca-

**If MGM is to gain and maintain political support, it is crucial that it not take from the consumer the ability to choose among a wide variety of housing at different price levels.**

tion. Some residents of outlying towns, as well as some farmers who fear interference with their agricultural operations, therefore, might welcome disincentives to exurban development — policies that result in a slower rate of growth and appreciating residential land values. As far as agricultural land values are concerned, one of the prime potential benefits of an urban growth boundary is protection of agriculture from land price inflation. Indeed, in Oregon, and therefore in North America, the earliest proponents of an urban growth boundary were farmers in the Willamette Valley, who feared urban encroachment and escalating land prices. (Leo 1998) Growth management, therefore, might generate support from anyone committed to a future in commercial agriculture. In the Winnipeg area, the provincial government has been encouraging both exurban residential development and the development near the city of massive hog farming

operations. That curious juxtaposition of development policies is likely, in any event, to produce support for some form of restriction on the urbanization of rural land.

If MGM is to gain and maintain political support, it is crucial that it not take from the consumer the ability to choose among a wide variety of housing at different price levels. Exurban development curbs and increased charges on low-density development at the fringe will place upward pressure on the prices of the housing affected by the restrictions and charges. To be sure, thanks in part to its slow growth, Winnipeg is one of the most affordable housing markets in the country, but the credibility of MGM demands that it not be or be seen as the cause of general land price inflation. It is important therefore to combine restrictions and extra charges on fringe development with incentives for development within the city. Three possibilities present themselves.

First, if there are to be increased charges on fringe development within the city, based on the need to cover costs of servicing low densities, it is logical that these be combined with rebates or incentives to developers of infill. These could be calculated on the reverse of the principles applied to the extra charges: A calculation of the savings over a period of time from fuller and therefore more efficient use of existing capacity in transit,

roads, water and sewer lines, reoccupation of schools that might otherwise be suffering declining enrolment, and so forth, could produce a sum, a percentage of which would then be offered to prospective developers as an incentive. This principle has been applied in a different form in the United States under the name of tax increment financing. Our suggestion is somewhat more conservative. Instead of calculating future tax revenues — which would be produced by any development, and might or might not balance expenses incurred by the development — we advocate calculating the savings specific to infill development and basing incentives on those. Tax increment financing available only for infill development would be a workable alternative to our suggestion.

Secondly, like many slowly growing cities, Winnipeg has a large stock of deteriorating housing in the inner city, available at very affordable prices, but in need of renovation. A number of community groups are engaged in renovation projects, but a problem that some are encountering is that building code renovation standards go beyond what is needed to ensure safety and serviceability of housing that, though deteriorated, has proven its worth over decades. The existence of this problem has been acknowledged and building code revision for heritage buildings is being developed, but nothing concrete has been

done about affordable housing. Though delving into this issue would require more time than can be provided by this paper, it is worth noting that some action in this area would not only ease the burdens of community volunteers but provide improved market incentives for housing renovation.

A third form of incentives for infill development could be provided by revisions in building codes and zoning regulations affecting new housing. Although conventional, low-density, single-use suburban land development is clearly a response to market demands, the frequent success in recent years of neo-traditional developments has shown for some time now that there is also a potential market demand for neighbourhood designs more in keeping with the goals of MGM. Since the 1970s, with the size of family units shrinking and the cost of housing escalating, developers have repeatedly identified market opportunities for more compact forms of housing — or for neighbourhoods where the proximity of stores and public facilities encourages more walking and less driving — only to be thwarted by planning regulations affecting such things as lot sizes, widths of rights-of-way or separation of uses. Since the late 1980s, the cause of compact housing and mixed-use neighbourhoods has been taken up by proponents of the so-called “new urbanism.” A perusal of the postings on the e-mail list of the Congress for the

New Urbanism produces numerous examples of the frustrations posed by conventional planning regulations, and in Winnipeg, these frustrations have had the net effect of continued production of a very limited and traditional range of new neighbourhood designs. One incentive, therefore, that would support MGM, and could produce political support for it, is a form of deregulation affecting the zoning and building codes for new neighbourhoods, or at least the re-writing of regulations so that developers can more easily choose between different styles of neighbourhood design.\*

In short, significant incentives for MGM can be created, even with very conservative calculations. Moreover, if they succeed in lessening or eliminating urban sprawl, they can save money in the long run. Incentives are particularly important because of Winnipeg's slow growth. In a rapidly growing city, a government agency could restrict growth with an urban growth boundary and the growth would almost immediately begin to increase the average residential density within the city and, before long, possibly have an effect on the inner city. However, in a slow-growth city, this process would take longer, possibly longer than a government could maintain public support for a policy without any of that policy's expected benefits materializing. Hence, a package of incentives and planning measures is critical to the political

feasibility of managing growth in a slow-growth metropolitan region.

## Transportation policies

As MGM has, as one of its goals, to produce housing of greater density, to encourage more mixed uses, and to manage overall urban growth, it must also take transportation into account. The growing problem of traffic congestion, the sheer expense of building new roads and highways, and the pollution caused by automobile use has produced growing pressures for a shift in transportation policy (Giuliano and Wachs 1993, 162-3). Portland's initiatives included the building of a transit mall, a pair of downtown streets for buses and pedestrians only, the tearing up of a waterfront expressway to build a park, the unification of transit into a single, metropolitan-wide system, and the establishment of a light rapid transit line (Leo 1998). Along the new transit line, compact mixed commercial and residential developments were then erected to further increase the viability of the public transportation system. Such neighbourhoods are known as transit-oriented development (TOD). Another possible support for transit was modelled in Phoenix, which does not have a MGM plan, but has seen significant success in its Bus Card Plus program, in which employers encourage their employees to use public transit by issuing bus credit cards

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\* A thorough discussion of how this could be done can be found in Ministries of Housing and Municipal Affairs, Government of Ontario, 1995.

(Rimsza 1997). Users are billed monthly for each ride taken to a maximum of the monthly bus pass fee.

While traffic congestion and pollution have not been as serious in Winnipeg as in many other North American cities, the costs of road and bridge construction and maintenance have seriously drained City resources. (Leo and Brown, 2000) A number of recent American studies have found that overall government motor vehicle-related expenditures significantly exceed revenues, thereby resulting in a hidden government subsidy of the auto (ICLEI 1997). For this reason too, transportation policies need to take a new direction and should be included in an overall MGM framework so that the construction of new roads and highways is compatible with overall transportation policy objectives.

In Winnipeg, a redirection of money for projects such as new bridges and roads toward public transit projects is critically important, and will become feasible once the city and the province abandon their self-imposed obligation to extend infrastructure to virtually every location that suits the convenience of land speculators. A good starting-point would be the construction of the Southwest Transit Corridor, a rapid transit line consisting of cost-effective diesel buses running on a concrete strip dedicated exclusively to transit, which has been a fixture of successive city plans. This line is considered

viable because it connects two population concentrations — downtown and the University of Manitoba — along the relatively heavily populated Pembina Highway corridor. It would ameliorate traffic congestion along Pembina Highway and encourage cost-effective, compact development along the route, in contrast to road and bridge projects' encouragement of sprawl. The estimated total cost for the entire facility would be \$70 million (City of Winnipeg 1997) — about \$45 million less than the Norwood Bridge. Postponement of this project has been a routine feature of City Council's annual budget deliberations for at least two decades. It has been studied at length. Implementation could begin at any time.

A related initiative would be measures to encourage businesses to locate along the Graham Avenue transit mall, which would be served by a spur line from the downtown end of the the Southwest Transit Corridor. Business could also be encouraged to become involved in such programs as Phoenix's Bus Card Plus program, referred to above. The viability of these initiatives would be supported by residential density increases produced by MGM, which would reduce auto dependence and increase the convenience of transit.

## Social policies

It is important to stress that, while MGM can act as an antidote to social isolation, which is likely to worsen many of the problems of poverty, (Harrell and Peterson, 1992; Jencks and Peterson, 1991; Marcuse, 1997; Van Kempen, 1997; Wilson, 1987) it is not a magic wand that will abolish inner-city problems, nor even a social program. In order to address these problems, other initiatives must be combined with MGM. It is not our intention, in this article, to contribute to the literature on remedies for inner-city social problems, but among the initiatives that need to be undertaken in Winnipeg, in addition to the housing programmes referred to above, are education, job training, affirmative action, improved accessibility to child care, a higher minimum wage, and especially community development in many forms (Silver, 2000). Particular attention needs to be paid to the growing concentration of aboriginal people in some inner-city neighbourhoods, and policies to address their problems should be undertaken in consultation with representatives of the aboriginal community itself.

## Environmental protection

Environmentalism has been a strong influence on many of the MGM frameworks in North America. For example, environmentalist groups, such as the 1000 Friends of Oregon, have played a large role in the development and evo-

lution of Oregon's MGM system (Leo 1998). Events in Oregon and other states where MGM is being attempted, as well as a large environmentalist literature, make it clear that there is a substantial degree of correspondence between the aims of MGM proponents and those of environmentalists. (Leo *et al*, 1998) Potentially, therefore, environmental concerns can produce political support for MGM. In Manitoba environmentalists carry little political weight, and Winnipeg's slow growth may be part of the reason. In such American jurisdictions as Oregon and Florida, where environmental concerns have played an important role in MGM, it was fears associated with rapid growth that provided much of the impetus for environmentalists' concerns.

It is possible, however, that, in time, environmental concerns will come more to the forefront, and play a role in a future politics of MGM. The proliferation of large-scale hog farms, together with a growing volume of residential developments relying on septic tanks seem certain to raise environmental issues, and, once cultivated, sensitivity to environmental issues may produce receptivity to MGM-related proposals. In the meantime, a small but often vocal environmentalist community is a source of support for MGM proposals.

## CRITICISMS

A proposal for MGM would be criticized for the short-term expenses that it would probably incur to the City and to the provincial government. It may be that as governments enter a post-deficit era, the funds for such a plan might become more available. As well, it is important to keep in mind that MGM would result in more efficient use of funds in the long run and could potentially result in lower property taxes and improved services. Therefore, any expenses incurred in administering and applying MGM should be seen as an investment rather than a net cost.

MGM will also be criticized as an unwarranted interference in the marketplace and with individual choices on where to live. While it is true that MGM intervenes in markets, it should be pointed out that tax rebates, housing policies, jurisdictional boundaries, and zoning and building codes have all served to “tamper” in the opposite direction. As well, many of the personal choices to move to the City’s fringe are based upon fears of crime, property devaluation, and poor schools, all things that are, in part, related to urban sprawl. Besides, as it is now, market mechanisms are clearly not about to end excess urban sprawl, significantly increase residential densities, or revive the inner city.

The case for intervention in the marketplace, therefore, is substantial.

One criticism might be that tampering with growth in the Winnipeg region will simply drive it away to another metropolitan area such as Calgary. If the suggestion implicit in this argument is that housing and associated retail development will be driven out, it is without substance, because such markets are inherently local ones. Corporate mobility is not a factor here. As for such major commercial developments as a bank’s regional headquarters or the headquarters of an insurance company — which may well be in a position to locate in another city — the proposals in this article would be unlikely to affect them significantly. In any event, the experience of Portland and Vancouver, (Leo 1998, 1994) among other jurisdictions, suggests that developers are less deterred by regulations — which exist in any case — than by regulations arbitrarily and sluggishly enforced. Finally, if MGM were to truly work in Winnipeg and result in a better overall quality of life for its residents, including better services or lower taxes, growth in Winnipeg might be encouraged.

A final criticism that might be levied at MGM is that there is little growth to redirect toward the inner city. As a result, MGM might make only a small difference at best. While this criticism has substance, there is growth, and while there

is, it may as well take a form that is economically viable for the city and urban region. And, as we have argued, sprawl is likely to be more costly to a slowly growing city than a rapidly growing one. MGM is crucial to changing the overall downhill direction of our cities by shift-

ing the traditional patterns of urban growth, regardless of how rapid that growth is.

## CONCLUSION

**M**etropolitan Growth Management for the Winnipeg area is both desirable and possible, even in a slow-growth context. Slow growth has had the effect of making Winnipeg's political leaders reluctant to challenge or regulate growth in the name of efficiency or even common sense, but we have uncovered no persuasive evidence that it cannot be done, provided the political will can be found. As we have argued, an effective MGM scheme

for Winnipeg would include citizen participation, an urban growth boundary, a series of incentives and disincentives for development, regional sharing of tax revenue, a focus on transportation and downtown renewal, and serious social initiatives, especially in the inner city. Such measures are capable of playing a role in the reduction of urban decay, the promotion of more efficient use of taxpayers' money, and the revival of the inner city.

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