

Mapping Corporate Power in Saskatchewan



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Regina Public Interest Research Group

Mapping Corporate Power in Saskatchewan

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This publication is a collaborative research effort between the Saskatchewan Office of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA SK), the Regina Public Interest Group (RPIRG) and the Community Research Unit (CRU) at the University of Regina. The primary research was compiled and coordinated by Dr. Simon Enoch, Director of CCPA Saskatchewan. Tahsina Taz Kabir provided invaluable technical support and assistance with the UCINet software program.

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About RPIRG

The Regina Public Interest Research Group (RPIRG) is a student-run, student-funded non-profit organization dedicated to community-based research, education, action and awareness in the public interest. RPIRG exists to provide its members with the resources to be active citizens on the University of Regina campus and in the greater community.

About CRU

The Community Research Unit (CRU), based in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Regina, builds relationships between our community and faculty by facilitating community-based participatory research and community service-learning opportunities. The CRU matches community groups interested in undertaking research with university faculty and student researchers and organizes the annual Arts CARES community service-learning program.

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Introduction

There is little doubt that Canada is currently undergoing a seismic shift in economic and political power as populations, money and political influence move from the traditional enclaves of eastern and central Canada to the west. As the Canadian economy becomes more reliant on primary resource extraction and less on manufacturing, the geography of Canadian corporate power is also undergoing a commensurate transformation. As *Maclean's* recently notes, western-based energy and mining companies accounted for eight of the country's 20 most profitable public companies in 2010. "That year, oil giant Suncor Energy earned \$36 billion in revenues, more than either the Bank of Montreal or CIBC. And Calgary, home to one in seven major corporate headquarters, now has more head offices than Montreal" (Wells and McMahon, 2012). Indeed William Carroll identifies the move of corporate head offices from the traditional Toronto-Montreal corridor to the western provinces in the past two decades as "a shift in the command centre of industry" (2001, 126).

While certainly not as dominant a corporate centre as Alberta, Saskatchewan has also seen its economic clout grow in recent years as world demand for oil, potash and uranium has increased. In 2010, Saskatchewan was the highest per capita exporting province in Canada, beating out even Alberta, exporting approximately \$23,050 worth of goods for every person in the province (Saskatchewan Trade and Export Partnership, 2011). While corporate head offices still gravitate towards Calgary and Edmonton, Saskatchewan has witnessed the burgeoning of important field offices particularly by many oil and gas industry majors (*Estevan Mercury*, 2011).

As the west becomes a locus for top corporate management, the networks forged by western-based corporations and their leadership become potential sites for the exercise of not only economic power, but political power as well. Given this shift, it seems an opportune time to investigate and identify the networks of corporate power as they exist in Saskatchewan and their relationship to our provincial political system. Indeed, with the ruling Saskatchewan Party pulling in a record amount of over \$3 million dollars in corporate donations in 2011, it seems appropriate to ask a number of questions regarding the role and function of these powerful institutions within our provincial political process. Some of the questions this study considers include; which corporations and/or Chief Executive Officers in Saskatchewan could be considered the dominant political players? What is the relationship between corporations and political parties in the province? How and where do corporations engage with government? Does Saskatchewan's corporate community have a coherent, unified vision for the political direction of the province and to what extent is Saskatchewan's corporate community active in promulgating this vision? The Saskatchewan Office hopes that the questions and issues raised by this report will contribute to a renewed discussion regarding the power of private corporations in politics and the potential policies required to ensure that this tremendous economic and political power does not corrupt or overwhelm our democracy.

The following study seeks to identify networks of corporate power in the province by documenting the inter-locking relationships between corporations, industry and trade associations, advocacy groups, policy institutes, universities,

Top 15 Corporate Contributors 2011

Saskatchewan Party		New Democratic Party	
	Amount		Amount
Concorde Group	101,280.00	Affinity Credit Union*	496,916.08
Redhead Equipment	56,480.00	Points West Consulting	11,783.44
Crescent Point Resources	51,200.00	Mosaic	10,783.44
328727 Alberta Ltd	40,000.00	Penn West Exploration	7,500.00
McKercher LLP	31,183.00	RBC Financial	7,083.44
Medallion Pipe Supply	30,150.00	KPMG	5,245.86
Bourgault Industries	30,000.00	G5 Management	5,000.00
PCL Construction	30,000.00	Prairie Mines and Royalty	5,000.00
Brandt Industries	28,652.00	TD Financial	5,000.00
MacPherson Leslie Tyerman	28,484.00	Knight Archer Insurance	4,066.88
Mosaic	27,888.00	Glaeske Medical	2,500.00
Brandt Tractor	27,480.00	Crestview Chrysler	2,491.72
KPMG	26,525.00	Mera Group	1,783.44
Dundee Realty	26,280.00	WF Botkin Construction LTD	1,283.44
Millenium Properties	26,092.00	Husky Energy Ltd	1,000.00
Total for 2011: \$3,086,535.00		Total for 2011: \$609,088.00	

*The financial data on corporate contributions within each party's Registered Political Party Fiscal Period Return (E-521) makes no distinction between donations and loans. The amount listed from Affinity Credit Union is a loan to the provincial NDP and is listed as a contribution until the loan is paid back.

political parties and government itself. We draw upon the traditions of sociological power structure research that emphasize the social networks in which these enterprises are embedded and the importance of viewing these networks as "arenas of power" (Scott, 1991, 182). The study of corporate interlocks is at the centre of this form of research. An interlock exists when a particular individual sits on two or more corporate boards, with multiple interlocks

between corporations revealing a level of dense corporate elite integration. Equally important to our research are the interlocks that exist between corporations and the governing boards of other corporate-sponsored or corporate-interest organizations and/or institutions, such as policy planning groups, inter-sectoral organizations, trade or industry associations, government advisory boards or other corporate interest advocacy groups. Cross-membership in such

organizations can be said to constitute a network of elite interaction that provide corporate elites with a “structural base for business leadership in a society” (Carroll, 2001, 203). These interlocks create social relations between enterprises and individuals that even at its weakest, creates the potential for the exercise of influence and power (Scott, 1991, 182). Such relations are “traces of power” in both an economic and social sense. Links between corporations at the level of governance enable some measure of inter-corporate coordination and control of the accumulation process while also serving to integrate leading directors into a corporate elite sharing a common outlook and capable of exercising political and cultural leadership in civil society (Carroll, 2001, 119).

Methodology

Our data collection deviates from more conventional sociological studies of corporate power insofar as our primary sample is not drawn from a list of the largest revenue-generating corporations based in the province. Rather, we draw our sample from the top 28 corporate contributors to the two major political parties in the province — the Saskatchewan Party and the New Democratic Party — from 2008 to 2010.¹ The reason for this is two-fold. First, while not an entirely accurate indicator of corporate political engagement, financial contributions to the political process at least indicate a perceived need by corporate leadership to participate in the politics of the province. Due to the lack of a provincial lobbyist registry that would give us a more detailed understanding of the issues and policies that specific corporations advance, we use corporate contributions as a proxy for corporate participation in the political process as the size and frequency of contributions to a political party can at least register a firm’s political and policy preferences to a certain extent. Second, and more importantly, given the

potential influence of Alberta-based corporations in the politics of our province, a focus solely on Saskatchewan-based corporations would have omitted an important segment of the corporate sector that operates in our province. A cursory look at the breakdown of the top corporate contributors to the two major parties in the three years studied confirms this. 21 percent of the top corporate contributors to the New Democrats were Alberta-based corporations, while 42 percent of the top contributors to the Saskatchewan Party were Alberta-based corporations during the same period. Given the prominence of Alberta-based corporations in the financing of our major political parties, omitting these corporations from our sample would have resulted in a partial and incomplete portrait of corporate networks in the province.

Once the top 28 corporate contributors to each political party in the three years studied were identified, we proceeded to identify the current chief executive officer and board of directors for each corporate donor. This information was culled from corporate websites, annual corporate reports, listings in *Forbes* and/or *Bloomberg Business Week’s* corporate online database, Canadian securities information found on SEDAR (System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval), Corporation Branch Notices in *The Saskatchewan Gazette*, the Corporations Canada database on the Industry Canada website and also from provincial and national newspapers. This information was then cross-referenced with membership in the governing boards of other corporate-sponsored or corporate-linked organizations and/or institutions, such as policy planning groups, inter-sectoral organizations, trade or industry associations, government advisory boards or other corporate interest/advocacy groups. We also included membership in the governing bodies of the major business schools in both Saskatchewan and Alberta universities due to their increasing importance as a site of corporate and governmental integration

(Carroll and Beaton, 2000). Lastly, due to the political and economic importance of the crown sector in Saskatchewan, we also included the three major crowns — SaskTel, SaskPower and SaskEnergy — in our final sample even though none of the three crowns were listed in the top 28 corporate donors to either political party during the period under review.

Using this data, we constructed a matrix to perform a membership network analysis where we could record the relations between the corporations and organizations included in the sample. Direct membership by a sitting CEO on the board of another corporation or corporate-interest organization was recorded as a “primary interlock” or a “strong tie.” Board or organizational memberships by other senior executives of a corporation were recorded as a “secondary interlock” or a “weak tie” (Brownlee, 2005, 56). Once we felt the data in the matrix had been completed to our satisfaction we used the UCINET 6 social network analysis software package to create a spatial visualization of our data that can be viewed on pages 19 and 20. Firms that did not possess any interlocks were removed from the spatial visualization in the interest of clarity.

Some Methodological Qualifications

While we tried to create as comprehensive a database as was possible with the information available it was not always possible to identify executive management for certain corporations. This is particularly true of the numbered

corporations (for example, 101125954 SASKATCHEWAN LTD.) that appear in the corporate donor lists to both political parties. There is very little available information on these firms beyond the notice of certificates of incorporation and mailing addresses that appear in *The Saskatchewan Gazette* or the ISC Corporate Registry.

Also, given the three-year time period within which we collected our data, executive positions, board membership and other organizational memberships were sure to change. To the best of our ability, we have included only the most recent (2010) positions within our database, although this is also sure to have changed in the intervening time since the data was first collected. For instance, even in the brief time frame within which this study is based, some of the corporations cited in the data no longer exist. Such is the case of Canadian Hydro Developers which was acquired by TransAlta in 2009. Therefore, given the fluid nature of the subjects in our study, we must emphasize that we can only capture a snapshot in time of the changing corporate networks that exist in our province.

Lastly, it is regrettable that we were unable to include the 2011 data that was recently released by Elections Saskatchewan within our study, particularly because as an election year it produced some of the largest corporate contributions in Saskatchewan political history. While we have incorporated some of the 2011 data into this report, it should be emphasized that the majority of our findings and conclusions are based only on data collected between the years 2008 to 2010.

Corporate Networks and Democracy

As one of the most powerful economic institutions of the modern age, the relationship between the corporation and democracy has always been fraught with tension. Fears that the unprecedented economic power of the private corporation could overwhelm the democratic process have been a recurring concern within liberal democracies almost since the birth of the corporate form (Marchand, 1998; Mitchell, 1989). Certain scholars view these fears as partially unfounded due to the perceived inability of the corporate sector to act in unison towards a coherent political vision. This is the infamous “Disunity Thesis” that views corporate leadership as a highly fractured group, solely concerned with the particular short-term interests of the firm and thereby incapable of “transforming their specific interest into the political interest” (Brownlee, 2005, 14). While the pressures of competitive capitalism no doubt mediate against the ability of corporate leadership to act in a concerted, unified manner on political issues, it does not foreclose the possibility for concerted political action on the part of corporate elites should the stakes be perceived as high enough.

It is well documented that Canada’s corporate elite made such a concerted effort to influence the political climate of the country beginning in the tumultuous economic times of the 1970s. In response to a political climate that was deemed to be hostile to the interests of business, leading corporate executives called for a renewed business activism in Canadian politics. The formation of the Business Council of National Issues (BCNI),² the Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB), the Fraser Institute and the pro-corporate



BCNI co-chairmen W.O. Twaits and Alfred Powis sit at head of conference table as plans for new national group are announced.

turn of the C.D. Howe Institute are often cited as evidence of a concerted mobilization of business activism beginning in the 1970s and continuing to the present day (Brownlee, 2005; Enoch, 2007; Ernst, 1992; Langille, 1987).

Indeed, Carroll views these policy–planning and advocacy organizations as “the most important means by which the Canadian corporate elite has formed and exercised its collective will in recent decades” (Cited in Brownlee, 2005, 73). The BCNI — considered by many to be the most powerful business lobby in the country — concurs, noting:

One of the Business Council’s most remarkable attributes is its ability to forge common positions on major issues ... Consensus has been achieved in virtually every task force initiative since 1981. There are several reasons for this. First the Council asks members to consider issues from a national perspective. Advocacy of individual company concerns is discouraged. Second, great emphasis is placed on balancing interests when specific issues are under consideration. This requires compromise and long-term thinking” (Langille, 1987, 80).

Such organizations can serve to advance corporate interests in numerous ways. As Brownlee explains, they can provide a setting where business leaders can meet with each other and with government representatives to familiarize themselves with policy issues and discuss general concerns. Secondly, policy organizations help to infuse the information and concepts provided by other 'experts' into the perspectives of corporate leaders and government officials, who are better able to use the information for political ends. Third, they supply a possible forum from which the elite can informally select business leaders capable of serving in government. This informal recruiting ground may extend to other experts, such as academics, who advance corporate policy ideas. Lastly, these organizations can act to mediate conflict within the corporate elite and facilitate consensus and unity on contested issues of policy (Brownlee, 2005, 73).

Such organizations are also crucial in the production of corporate leaders that possess the ability to look beyond their specific firm or industry interest and represent the general interest of business as a whole. American sociologist Michael Useem characterizes such corporate leaders as "the inner circle." This is a segment of the corporate elite with the "capacity to promote the broad, overall needs of business and to act as political leadership for business as a whole" (Ibid, 24). By virtue of their special positions within corporate networks and extensive connections within the business community, this group is uniquely suited to mobilize corporate resources and act at the forefront of business-government relations. The "inner circle" is informed by a "class-wide rationality" derived from common participation in various policy network associations and multiple board interlocks. This "class-wide rationality" helps inner circle executives to successfully advance public policies of significant concern to large numbers of firms. Useem explains that if the 'inner circle' "promote these concerns, both

individually and through select organizations, government policy-makers will hear, though of course not always heed, a point of view far more indicative of the general outlook of business than representatives of individual companies could ever provide" (1984, 16).

While governments may not be quite the dutiful lapdogs of corporate power that some may believe, they nevertheless would be loath to dismiss the suggestions of such a powerful constituency. Beyond the substantial direct means that corporations can advocate on their own behalf, such as through campaign contributions, lobbying, public affairs and other forms of advocacy, corporations also hold an inordinate amount of indirect, or structural power due to the impact that their economic decisions can have upon a region. The most important mechanism of structural power stems from the ability of corporations to privately determine the allocation of investment and resources, which subsequently can impact levels of employment, consumption and economic growth within a region. Following this, governments of all political stripes are extremely reticent to enact policies that might discourage private investment for fear of capital and job flight to more "business-friendly" regions and all the attendant political consequences that such a flight would entail (Farnsworth and Holden, 2006; Fuchs, 2007; Hale, 2009; Przeworski and Wallerstein, 1988). Given this inordinate level of economic power, governments must always seriously consider the arguments advanced by the leading representatives of the corporate sector.

In the case of Canada, it certainly appears that at both the federal and provincial level, governments have been quite attentive to the policy suggestions of the country's corporate elite. Indeed, since the renewal of corporate activism in the 1970s, the country has witnessed sweeping changes in public policy, much of it aligned to the political priorities of Canada's

corporate sector. Certainly the primary facets of neoliberalism that have been implemented over the past thirty years, including the drive for bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements; the weakening or elimination of social programs; promoting “flexibility” of labour through the erosion of trade union rights; the targeting of deficit reduction and inflation to the detriment of full employment policies; restructuring of the taxation system to the benefit of capital; the deregulation and privatization of sectors of the economy, and the shielding of key aspects of domestic policy from democratic contestation have all been championed by Canada’s corporate sector (Albo, 2002; Enoch, 2007; McBride and Shields, 1997). Thomas d’Aquino, former CEO of the BCNI, certainly corroborates this evaluation:

Change is now broadly accepted by Canadians as necessary and I am pleased to say that business leaders are leading the charge. Even more significantly, Canada’s political class has experienced a collective conversion. The need for personal, corporate and capital gains tax relief is now firmly entrenched in the dogma of the mainline parties. Debt reduction has become the sensible thing to do. New economy principles are now the rage. Free trade commands widespread support (d’Aquino, 2000).

Further assessing the impact of the corporate lobby on public policy, d’Aquino remarks:

If you ask yourself, in which period since 1900 has Canada’s business community had the most influence on public policy, I would say it was in the last twenty years. Look at what we stand for and look at what all the governments, all the major parties ... have done, and what they want to do. They have adopted the agenda we’ve been fighting for in the past two decades (d’Aquino cited in Newman, 1998).

Indeed, recently released documents published by the *Globe and Mail* regarding Finance Minister Jim Flaherty’s private Wakefield meetings with top Canadian CEOs demonstrates that Canada’s corporate sector continues to have inordinate access and — if we take the current government’s policies as any indication — an enduring influence over the federal government’s policy direction (Curry, 2012).³

What the above illustrates is that despite the claims of the disunity theorists, the corporate sector can act in a relatively unified manner and can exercise substantial influence over public policy provided the requisite networks, organization and committed leadership exists. In light of this, to what extent does Saskatchewan’s corporate sector compare? Does it maintain similar networks, organizational capacity and a leadership capable of advancing the general interest of the corporate sector within the province? It is to these questions that we now turn.

Corporate Contributions

One of the most direct and visible ways corporations participate in the political process is through financial contributions to political parties. While corporate contributions are prohibited at the federal level due to the campaign finance laws enacted in 2003, corporations can still make contributions to provincial political parties. In Saskatchewan, there is no legal limit to how much corporations can contribute to the provincial parties:

Saskatchewan's electoral legislation does not limit the amount of contributions a registered political party or candidate may collect, however, contributions cannot be collected from persons outside Canada who are not Canadian citizens. As well, no anonymous contribution in excess of \$250.00 may be accepted by a registered political party or candidate. Any such contribution must be reported and forwarded by the chief official agent or business manager to the Chief Electoral Officer (Elections Saskatchewan, 2012).

Indeed, as was mentioned, 2011 saw some of the largest corporate contributions to the two major political parties in Saskatchewan history. However, before examining the top corporate contributors to the two major provincial parties, we should briefly explore the academic literature on why corporations make political donations in the first place and what they ultimately expect to gain — if anything — from the financing of political parties.

On the subject of campaign contributions, the standard public response from corporate executives as to why corporations contribute to political parties is usually the rote answer

that they are “contributing to the democratic process” or demonstrating “good corporate citizenship” (Kent, 2006; Public Policy Forum, 2003). Despite this admission, few among the general population — or even among corporate executives — would view corporate contributions as pure altruism on the part of business. As Tom Kent reminds us, contributions based solely on the basis of “assisting the democratic process” would actually be in violation of a corporation’s legal mandate to advance the financial interests of its investors:

*Business corporations are licensed by law to conduct particular enterprises for the benefit of their investors. **The only legal reason for their executives to give away the shareholders’ money is that the gift will advance their business.** Political donations are never admitted, by the recipients or openly by the donors, to be so motivated. But if they are not, they are an illicit diversion of money from its due use. Corporations are licensed to run their own affairs, not to intervene in the nation’s business (Kent, 2006, 87, our emphasis).*

Perhaps only the most naïve of liberal pluralists would believe that corporate financial contributions to political parties are somehow devoid of obligation or reciprocity. The question is, what sort of obligation do contributions confer on political parties? Much of the academic literature on this question tends to view corporate contributions as either ideological or pragmatic. They can be ideological in the sense that they are contributions to a party that will advance certain policies while in power that donors perceive will contribute to a hospitable business climate. Conversely, they may also contribute in order

to keep parties that they view as inhospitable to business out of power. Pragmatic considerations would use contributions as a means to extract private goods from the political system, whether certain policies, government contracts, purchase of access to politicians or signals to bureaucrats or other officials (Fisher, 1994; McMenam, 2012). Fortunately, in a liberal democracy such as Canada, outright political corruption and bribery is for the most part rare. Retired UBC Commerce professor W.T. Stanbury notes that large contributions only very, very rarely purchase a specific action favourable to the donor. Rather, what contributions purchase is *access*. As Stanbury (2003) explains, access can refer to a variety of things:

It means getting one's telephone calls and other communications returned promptly. This is a non-trivial matter when a minister receives hundreds of calls per day, and only has time to handle a fraction personally. More than one politician has remarked that big donors usually get much higher priority in having their calls returned promptly. Access means getting a face-to-face meeting (with the heavy-hitters) where others have to make do with written communication (from persons with less influence) ... Access also


means creating a sympathetic (or at least neutral) reputation to precede requests for careful consideration of one's proposals. It also may mean ensuring the availability of an opportunity to appeal decisions to a higher (read political) level if one loses at a lower level (read in the bureaucracy). Of course, access means that ministers connect faces to issues/problems/concerns ... Finally ... access helps the big donors obtain a more complete and frank assessment of how government sees the issue. Obviously this can be of great help in shaping how the donor makes his/her case.

As Stanbury notes, there can be no influence without first securing access to key decision-makers. How often this privileged access for corporate donors translates into influence appears to be an open question. McMenam likens business contributions to an investment with an "uncertain and relatively low probability of return at an uncertain point of time." However, while the size of the return is also uncertain, it is also likely to "be very large indeed" (2012, 5). Nevertheless, corporate donors must deem the probability of return reasonable enough to explain their historic and continued funding of political parties.

Corporate Contributions to Saskatchewan Political Parties⁴


In regards to corporate contributions to Saskatchewan political parties in the period under review, we can see that the Saskatchewan Party far and away outperforms the provincial NDP. From 2008 to 2011, the Saskatchewan Party received \$6,069,554 in corporate contributions. Over the same period, the New Democrats received \$950,789 in corporate money, a ratio of over 6 to 1.

Total Corporate Contributions to Saskatchewan Political Parties 2008-2011




Even when we include contributions from trade unions to the New Democrats, the Saskatchewan Party still remains well in the lead. If we combine the corporate and trade union contributions to the NDP from 2008 to 2011, the New Democrat's total rises from \$950,789 to \$1,545,732, still well behind the Saskatchewan Party's haul in corporate money alone. The disparity is even more acute if we remove the Affinity Credit Union loan of \$496,916.08 from the total amount of corporate contributions to the provincial NDP.

Saskatchewan Party Corporate Contributions versus NDP Trade Union Contributions 2008-2011




Saskatchewan Party versus NDP (NDP Combined Corporate and Trade Union Contributions) 2008-11



One interesting aspect of this data is the degree to which corporate contributions to the New Democrats outweigh that of trade union contributions. Part of the political mythology of Saskatchewan politics is that if the Saskatchewan Party is funded by "big business," then the New Democrats are funded by "big labour," thereby constituting some sort of "balance"

(see Mandryk, 2006, B7). However, not only do trade union contributions to the NDP pale in comparison to the corporate donations of the Saskatchewan Party, but in only one year (2010) of the period under review did trade union money eclipse corporate money to the New Democrats.


Corporate versus Trade Union Contributions to the Saskatchewan New Democrats 2008-2011



Another interesting aspect of our study is the regional source of corporate contributions to Saskatchewan political parties. As was mentioned in the methodology section, the influence of Alberta-based corporations on the financing of Saskatchewan political parties made it incumbent to include these corporations in any study of corporate networks in our province. As illustrated in the above right chart, the Saskatchewan Party relies a great deal on the largesse of Alberta-based corporations, which constitute over 40 percent of their top contributors in the three years studied. The NDP also receive sizeable, if relatively smaller, contributions from Alberta-based corporations with just over 20 percent of its top corporate donors hailing from Wild Rose Country. The NDP also have significantly more support from Ontario-based corporations, although the majority of this can be traced to its support from Eastern-headquartered banks.

Source of Top 28 Saskatchewan Party Corporate Contributions 2008-2010


● Other ● Ontario ● Alberta ● Saskatchewan ● N/A



Source identified by provincial location of head corporate office of contributing firm

Source of Top 28 NDP Corporate Contributions 2008-2010

● Other ● Ontario ● Alberta ● Saskatchewan ● N/A



Source identified by provincial location of head corporate office of contributing firm


Given the growing interest in Saskatchewan oil reserves by Alberta-based oil and gas firms, this level of financing from our western neighbour is probably not too surprising. Indeed, in regards to the level of financial support each party receives from different sectors of the economy, we can see that both parties receive a substantial portion of their revenues from industries based in the energy and energy service sector. Just under one-third (28 percent) of the proportion of

Saskatchewan Party's top donations were based in the energy and energy service sector, with real estate and construction also making significant contributions. The New Democrats received just over 20 percent (22 percent) from the energy and energy service sector. However, just over half

(52 percent) of the proportion of top corporate donations to the NDP hail from the banking and finance sector. Much of this support derives from Saskatchewan-based credit unions, which contributed over \$90,000 to the NDP in the three year period studied.


Contribution Breakdown by Sector of Top 28 Saskatchewan Party Corporate Contributors 2008-2010

- Banking/Finance/Insurance
- Energy (Oil, Gas, Uranium)
- Energy Service
- Construction/Engineering
- Real Estate/Property Development
- Legal/Accounting/Consulting Services
- Media/Communications
- Agricultural
- Mining/Service
- Other



Contribution Breakdown by Sector of Top 28 NDP Party Corporate Contributors 2008-2010

- Banking/Finance/Insurance
- Energy (Oil, Gas, Uranium)
- Energy Service
- Construction/Engineering
- Real Estate/Property Development
- Legal/Accounting/Consulting Services
- Media/Communications
- Agricultural
- Mining/Service
- Other



Corporate Networks in Saskatchewan

As was discussed, corporate power structure research places a great deal of emphasis on the network of interlocks or relationships between corporations themselves and between corporations and other corporate-interest organizations such as policy planning groups, industry associations, advisory boards, etc. As reflections of social cohesion, interlocks are assumed to facilitate the political unity among the corporate elite necessary for effective political action. Those corporate executives who are linked to multiple corporate boards and hold multiple memberships in corporate-interest organizations are thought to be better situated to both advance and communicate the general interest of the corporate sector over and above the particular interest of their firm or industry. As Maclean, Harvey and Chia summarize:

These individuals variously hold multiple company directorships; play leading roles in trade and industrial standards organizations; advise governments; join industry and government commissions; establish charities and pressure groups; participate as experts in public debates; and join the boards of leading cultural, sporting and educational organizations. It is through these channels that they promote institutional change and pursue organizational goals (2010, 340).

To reiterate, cross-membership in such organizations can be said to constitute a network of elite interaction that provide corporate elites with a “structural base for business leadership in a society” (Carroll, 2001, 203). These interlocks create social relations between enterprises and individuals that even at its weakest, creates the *potential* for the exercise of influence and power

(Scott, 1991, 182). We must stress that networks hold the *potential for influence*. Without a comprehensive lobbying registry through which we could evaluate the success of corporate lobbying efforts on government policy, we can only proceed on anecdotal evidence and public statements by corporate leaders regarding the efficacy of their efforts to influence policy. Such an exercise — while interesting — would not be rigorous enough to make confident assertions regarding the power of corporations in the province to influence policy. What we can do with the information publically available is identify the corporate leaders, firms and organizations that are best situated to exercise a leadership role in regards to business activism on political issues in the province due to their multiple cross-memberships on corporate boards and organizations of influence. The following findings should therefore be considered with these qualifications in mind.

As we can see from the chart on the next page, many of the corporate donors to Saskatchewan political parties maintain multiple direct and indirect linkages with other corporations and corporate-interest groups. While direct or primary links between the CEO of a firm and other corporations or organizations can be viewed as more significant than secondary links, secondary links still weave together networks of firms and organizations in a more general way and serve to integrate senior management personnel along socio-cultural and ideological lines.

As the chart illustrates, the CEOs that possess the most direct linkages to other corporations and corporate-interest groups are Paul J. Hill of the Hill Group of Companies, Gavin Semple of

Multiple Corporate Linkages

Firm and CEO	Primary Links	Secondary Links	Total Linkages
MacPherson Leslie and Tyerman LLP (Robert Pletch)	1 direct link	6 indirect links	7 linkages
Cameco Corporation (Timothy Gitzel)	2 direct links	5 indirect links	7 linkages
PotashCorp (Bill Doyle)	3 direct links	2 indirect links	5 linkages
Hill Group of Companies (Paul J. Hill)	4 direct links	1 indirect link	5 linkages
Cenovus Energy (Brian C Ferguson)	1 direct link	3 indirect links	4 linkages
SaskTel (Ron Styles)	3 direct links	1 indirect link	4 linkages
Brandt Industries (Gavin Semple)	3 direct links	0 indirect links	3 linkages
Mosaic (James T. Prokopanko)	1 direct links	2 indirect links	3 linkages
SaskPower (Robert Watson)	2 direct links	1 indirect link	3 linkages


Brandt Industries, Bill Doyle of PotashCorp and Ron Styles of SaskTel. Paul J. Hill could certainly be considered the biggest power player of the group insofar as he retains membership in organizations that have national significance. Hill personally holds governing roles in the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, the Fraser Institute, the C.D. Howe Institute and holds a leadership role in the Paul J. Hill School of Business CEO Advisory Circle at the University of Regina.

As has been mentioned to some extent, the CCCE is considered by many to be the most powerful corporate lobby in the country. The Fraser Institute and C.D. Howe Institute also enjoy national prominence in their efforts to advance corporate interests through their full-throated advocacy of neoliberal policies over the past thirty years. Given his membership in these


exclusive organizations, Hill could certainly be characterized as belonging to Michael Useem's "inner circle" of corporate elites. Indeed, in a profile of Saskatchewan's ten most influential businessmen in *SaskBusiness*, Hill "not only gets through to Canadian corporate leaders and cabinet members, his calls are also answered in Washington and Rome" (Martin, 2001, 25).

Following close behind Hill, at least in national prominence is PotashCorp CEO Bill Doyle. During the period under review, Doyle held governing positions with the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, the C.D. Howe Institute and Canpotex. Doyle has been the subject of controversy over his statements that Saskatchewan's past social democratic governments promoted a "philosophy of failure" and a "gospel of envy" (Johnstone, 2011).


Direct Linkages: Paul J. Hill



Direct Linkages: Bill Doyle



Direct Linkages: Gavin Semple



With less of a national profile but still demonstrating significant provincial prominence is Gavin Semple, the owner and president of Brandt Group of Companies, the largest privately held company in Saskatchewan, who in addition to membership on the Fraser Institute Board of Directors also belongs to the Levene Graduate School of Business Advisory Board and is Vice-Chair of Enterprise Saskatchewan. Semple is also thought to have played a key advisory role in Brad Wall's transition team after the Saskatchewan Party's election victory in 2007 (Mandryk, 2007). Other prominent corporate executives with multiple direct linkages include


SaskTel's Ron Styles who sits on the board of the Conference Board of Canada, is a member in the board of governors for Junior Achievement of Saskatchewan and also sits on the Paul J. Hill School of Business CEO Advisory Circle.

Demonstrating less direct linkages through their CEO but still showing impressive multiple linkages through senior management is Cameco Corporation, MacPherson Leslie and Tyerman LLP and Cenovus Energy. What is interesting in relation to other corporate power structure research is that in our sample, CEOs were much more likely to sit on the boards of corporate-interest or

Corporate-Organizational Linkages

Organization/Institution	Primary Links	Secondary Links	Total Linkages
Enterprise Saskatchewan	8 direct links	8 indirect links	16 linkages
Edwards School of Business Advisory Council (University of Saskatchewan)	2 direct links	4 indirect links	6 linkages
Junior Achievement Saskatchewan	1 direct link	5 indirect links	6 linkages
Canadian Council of Chief Executives	4 direct links	1 indirect link	5 linkages
Canadian Bankers Association Executive Council	1 direct link	4 indirect links	5 linkages
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers	2 direct links	3 indirect links	5 linkages
Canadian Nuclear Association	3 direct links	1 indirect link	4 linkages
SaskCentral	2 direct links	1 indirect link	3 linkages
University of Alberta Business Advisory Council	2 direct links	1 indirect link	3 linkages
Credit Union Central	2 direct links	1 indirect link	3 linkages
Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce	0 direct links	3 indirect links	3 linkages
North Saskatoon Business Association	0 direct links	3 indirect links	3 linkages
Saskatoon Chamber of Commerce	0 direct links	3 indirect links	3 linkages
C.D. Howe Institute	2 direct links	1 indirect link	3 linkages
Fraser Institute	2 direct links	0 indirect links	2 linkages
Conference Board of Canada	2 direct links	0 indirect links	2 linkages

Figure 1.2 Spatial Network Map of Corporate-Organizational Linkages in Saskatchewan



Legend is on page 27.

Cross-Membership in Corporate-Interest or Advocacy Groups

As Figure 1.2 illustrates, there is no group that maintains as many multiple linkages with our sample of corporate contributors than that of Enterprise Saskatchewan (ESK). As we can see from the spatial map, Enterprise Saskatchewan serves as the primary nexus for corporate-government interaction in our province. During the period of our study, Enterprise Saskatchewan's board of directors and its various sector teams revealed over 16 direct and indirect linkages with the top corporate contributors to both major political parties. Interestingly, the ratio was evenly split, with 8 of the top Saskatchewan Party corporate donors maintaining an association with ESK, and 8 of the top NDP corporate donors maintaining an association also.

The purpose of Enterprise Saskatchewan as envisioned by the Wall government was to remove the function of economic development from the government and outsource it to the private sector (Enoch, 2011; Johnstone, 2004). The ultimate goal of the agency is to keep Saskatchewan among the most competitive and attractive business climates in Canada and the world. According to ESK CEO Chris Dekker, "Our role is to create the best environment for business — then get out of the way" (Cited in Percy, 2010). Dekker is candid in what constitutes success for ESK, "[reduce] barriers to business. We need to reduce more red tape. We need to lobby and push for more competitive tax regimes." Dekker continues, "our success in maintaining and enhancing the competitive environment will continue to be measured by GDP growth, business confidence as measured by

the Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB) and the important feedback we receive from business groups such as our Chambers of Commerce" (Ibid). That ESK's measure of success appears to be entirely reliant on the opinions of business and its advocacy organizations should alarm citizens who believe that economic development is more than just satisfying the whims of the business community. Moreover, the outsourcing of such an important function of government to an agency dominated by corporate contributors constitutes a dangerous step towards the privatization of government policy-making and raises serious concerns about democratic accountability.

While the amount of direct influence that corporate donors appear to exercise in a quasi-governmental agency such as Enterprise Saskatchewan constitutes perhaps the most overt example of corporate influence in our provincial political system, it should not discount the influence that other corporate interest or advocacy organizations can exercise over the political climate in our province.

As we have mentioned, CEOs like Paul J. Hill, Bill Doyle and Gavin Semple maintain membership in high-profile national corporate lobby and advocacy groups like the CCCE, the Fraser Institute and the C.D. Howe Institute, all of which promulgate some variant of neoliberal economic policy. However, as can be seen from Figure 1.2, our sample also identifies multiple corporate-organizational linkages with other provincial and locally based organizations that can be considered equally important to both elite

cohesion and the promulgation of corporate interests in public policy discourse.

As Andrew Stritch observes, trade associations like the Canadian Bankers Association, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers or Credit Union Central that exist to advance the interests of specific sectors of industry and even more localized business associations like Chambers of Commerce perform five main functions in regard to policymaking: (1) monitoring political developments relevant to the association's members, including policy proposals, regulations, legislation, appointments and the emergence of new issues; (2) direct lobbying of proximate policymakers, involving personal contacts and representations before various government agencies at home and abroad; (3) indirect lobbying — affecting policy indirectly by attempting to shape public opinion through media relations, advocacy advertising, public relations activities, etc.; (4) building alliances with other groups to broaden the base of influence; and (5) research and policy analysis to provide a solid basis for advocacy (Stritch 2005, 639). Indeed, Stritch argues that as government capacity for research has diminished due to funding cuts and outsourcing, business has become less complacent in its relations with government and has had to “engage more systematically in a battle of ideas with other groups and interests. The mobilization of knowledge gives well-resourced and well-organized groups an important potential for agenda-setting and advocacy” (Ibid, 640). Moreover, regional and more localized business associations such as local Chambers of Commerce can also act as transmission belts for policy ideas promulgated at the national level by national or international business associations.

Lastly, organizations such as Junior Achievement Saskatchewan perform a rather different function; mainly the dissemination of pro-business ideas and free-market economics within the school

system. Junior Achievement has a long history of attempting to influence school curriculum to align with corporate interests, particularly in the teaching of economics.⁵ As Junior Achievement President Donald Hardenbrook famously proclaimed, “the test of time has proved that Junior Achievement is the best system of teenage economic and business indoctrination ever devised” (Cited in Sukarieh and Tannock, 2009, 774). Given this history, it is alarming that in Saskatchewan, the Junior Achievement “Economics for Success” program is delivered in every high school in Saskatoon and reaches close to 17,000 students within the province (JA Saskatchewan, 2012). One might wonder what the reaction of the business community would be if a similar trade union sponsored course on economics was similarly adopted throughout high schools in the province. At the very least, it seems that the curriculum presented by JA Saskatchewan in the province's schools should undergo a thorough independent review to ascertain its suitability as a program of instruction for Saskatchewan students.

What the above illustrates is that even at the local and provincial level, a thick network of corporate interest and advocacy groups exist not only as an integrative mechanism for enterprises that would otherwise be fragmented but also to promulgate corporate-backed policy ideas within the province of Saskatchewan. As we have been at pains to emphasize, the mere existence of these groups and networks does not automatically indicate policy influence. Without more detailed data on the lobbying efforts by the various corporations and groups cited in this study we can only speculate in regards to how responsive the current government has been in addressing the policy concerns of corporations over and above that of other groups. While the major initiatives of this government, particularly in regards to corporate taxation, labour legislation, privatization and de-regulation efforts such as the New West Partnership would seem to

suggest an acute affinity with corporate-backed policy proposals, such a link can only remain speculative without the ability to publically access government information on corporate lobbying efforts.

What the accumulated evidence in this report does indicate is that Saskatchewan does appear to possess the requisite corporate networks, committed corporate leadership, organization and access to government through agencies like Enterprise Saskatchewan to suggest a prominent role for corporations in the shaping of public policy and public opinion in the province. Moreover, the links that corporate leaders such as Paul J. Hill, Bill Doyle, Gavin Semple and others maintain with corporate interest and advocacy groups of national prominence indicates the growing political clout of Saskatchewan's corporate leadership beyond the province. This would seem to confirm the

arguments made in the introduction, that as economic power slowly shifts to the Canadian West, political power and influence will surely follow. Similar shifts in regional economic power — such as the ascendance of southwestern “Sunbelt” capital in the United States in the wake of northeastern de-industrialization in the 1970s — had enormous political ramifications, fundamentally transforming the U.S. Republican Party and heralding the ascendance of the New Right and Ronald Reagan (Davis, 1986). While the shift in Canadian economic and political power is still in its infancy, it remains to be seen if the rising power of western Canadian corporate elites will have as transformative an impact on Canadian politics. What we do know is that the potential leadership, networks and organizational apparatus to achieve such a transformation seems to currently be under construction.

Recommendations

Given the above, it is imperative that the Saskatchewan public be given access to more information on how their government is affected by lobbying efforts by both private corporations and their interest and advocacy groups. Premier Brad Wall has made overtures in this direction in the past and we would strongly advocate that a comprehensive and detailed lobbyist registry and database be made available to the public as soon as possible. As it currently stands, Saskatchewan is one of the only three provinces (along with New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island) that have not enacted lobbying legislation. It is well recognized that even when a government operates above board, lack of transparency in regards to lobbying and party financing can result in the perception of undue influence, which can only increase public cynicism about politicians, parties, political processes and institutions (Fisher, 1994, 690). A fully accessible public database that allowed citizens to monitor the lobbying efforts of corporations and their interest groups on government would be an effective first step towards making the dealings of corporations and governments more transparent.

Recently, calls have been made to outlaw both corporate and trade union donations at the provincial level — most forcefully by NDP leadership candidate Erin Weir (CBC News, 2012). Such a move would certainly aid in reversing the perception of undue influence and political favoritism. However, even with restrictions on direct party financing, we would note that corporations still exercise enormous structural power in regards to their investment decisions. While such a step would blunt the

power of corporate money to a certain extent, it should not be viewed as negating the political influence of corporations entirely.

In the interim, we believe that contributions by numbered corporations should clearly indicate the owner of said corporation in any filings made to Elections Saskatchewan. For example, an ISC Corporate Registry search revealed that Paul J. Hill contributed over \$19,000 to the Saskatchewan Party in 2011 through six numbered companies.⁶ In the interest of transparency and full disclosure to the public, individual owners who make political contributions to political parties through numbered corporations should be clearly identified in order to dispel the common perception that such companies are merely “shells” designed to funnel money into the political system without accountability.

The decision to outsource economic development to the private sector through the auspices of Enterprise Saskatchewan was unnecessary at best and potentially damaging to democratic accountability at worst. While the scope of Enterprise Saskatchewan has recently diminished, it should be disbanded immediately and economic development policy returned to our elected representatives in government. Such a move would not prevent the corporate community from continuing to lobby or consult on issues of economic development as they see fit. What it would do is remove the perception that the corporate community has been given free rein to design government economic development policy to the detriment of other groups in the province.

Appendix

Saskatchewan Party Top 28 Corporate Contributors 2008-2010 (highest to lowest)

2010		2009		2008	
Donor	Amount	Donor	Amount	Donor	Amount
Bourgault Industries	\$26,500	Penn West Petroleum Ltd	\$20,353	Penn West Petroleum Ltd	\$17,340
Remcon Ltd Powerline Construction	20,000	KPMG Chartered Accountants	14,244	Loraas Disposal Services	14,458
Penn West Petroleum Ltd	17,500	Rawlco Radio Saskatoon	11,273	Rawlco Radio Saskatoon	11,823
KPMG Chartered Accountants	14,196	Cavalier Enterprises Ltd	10,000	Boardwalk Rental Communities	10,000
Concorde Group Corp	11,440	Loraas Disposal Services	8,193	Cavalier Enterprise Ltd	10,000
HCI Ventures Ltd	11,275	Medallion Pipe Supply Company	5,952	Oilsands Quest Inc	6,839
Rawlco Radio Saskatoon	10,811	Brandt Industries/Tractor	5,236	Western Financial Group	5,936
Canadian Western Bank	10,000	Viterra	5,194	Robertson Stromberg Pederson LLP	5,309
Park Derochie Coatings Ltd	10,000	565509 Saskatchewan Ltd	5,000	Brandt Industries/Tractor	5,194
Tonko Realty Advisors Ltd	10,000	Agincourt Investments	5,000	565509 Saskatchewan Ltd	5,000
Cenovus Energy Inc	9,240	Westcap Management	5,000	Agincourt Investments	5,000
Medallion Pipe Supply Company	8,080	Standard Land Company Inc	4,761	Alliance Pipelines	5,000
Talisman Energy	7,500	Prairie Birch Royalties	4,523	Baytex Energy	5,000
Alliance Energy	6,980	Alliance Energy	4,345	Canadian Hydro Developers	5,000
Prairie Mines and Royalty Ltd	6,310	Agrium	4,051	Canadian Western Bank	5,000
JV Driver Projects Inc	6,240	Redhead Equipment Ltd	4,035	Norterra Inc	5,000
Redhead Equipment Ltd	5,373	Millenium III Properties Association	4,030	Stockyards Prince Albert LP	5,000
565509 Saskatchewan Ltd	5,000	Meyers Norris Penny	3,933	York Realty	5,000
Agincourt Investments	5,000	Harvard Developments/Broadcasting	3,834	Harvard Developments/Broadcasting	4,701
Apex Oilfield Services Inc	5,000	TransAlta	3,734	Spotlight Strategies Inc	4,680
Canadian Helicopters	5,000	Crescent Point Resources	3,653	Meyers Norris Penny	4,620
Canadian Natural Resources Ltd	5,000	Petrobank Energy and Resources	3,653	Inland Lehigh Cement Ltd	4,614
Clark Builders	5,000	APEGS	3,551	Merit Contractors	4,139
CNR Echo Resources Inc	5,000	Kanuka Thuringer LLP	3,391	Viterra	3,917
Don Wheaton Ltd	5,000	Merit Contractors Association	3,361	Canada's National Brewers	3,834
Horizon Construction Management	5,000	Bruce Power	3,345	Shaw Communications Inc	3,681
Melcor Developments	5,000	Evident Corporate Investigations and Security Counseling	3,303	Graham Construction	3,546
Peace Hills Insurance	5,000	Phoenix Advertising	3,282	APEGS	3,528
TOTAL	\$246,445	TOTAL	\$160,228	TOTAL	\$173,155

New Democratic Party Top 28 Corporate Contributors 2008-2010 (highest to lowest)

2010		2009		2008	
Donor	Amount	Donor	Amount	Donor	Amount
Affinity Credit Union	\$29,707	Affinity Credit Union	\$56,687	Talisman Energy Inc	5,000
G5 Management Ltd	10,736	Nexen Inc	10,216	RBC Royal Bank	4,462
Penn West Energy Trust	9,012	Penn West Energy Trust	5,820	Olive Waller Zinkhan and Waller LLP	3,524
Prairie Mines and Royalty	5,736	Olive Waller Zinkhan and Waller LLP	3,978	Macpherson Leslie and Tyerman LLP	3,274
101154547 Saskatchewan Ltd	5,000	KPMG Management Services	2,872	Trans Canada Pipelines Ltd	3,000
McGrath and Associates Inc	5,000	Conexus Credit Union	2,403	Mosaic Potash Colonsay	1,630
Olive Waller Zinkhan and Waller LLP	3,950	Enbridge Pipelines Inc	2,097	Conexus Credit Union	1,544
McGrath Farms	3,274	Talisman Energy	2,000	Rawlco Radio Ltd	1,456
Sinnett Pork Farm Ltd	3,236	Mosaic Potash Colonsay	1,812	CIBC	1,432
KPMG Management Services	3,224	Sherritt Coal	1,685	Affinity Credit Union	1,424
101125954 Saskatchewan Ltd	2,500	Scotiabank	1,347	SaskCentral	1,424
Talisman Energy	2,250	AMEC Americas	1,162	Scotiabank	1,354
Husky Energy Ltd	1,736	Areva Resources Canada	1,162	ML Senko Legal Profession Corp	1,088
Scotiabank	1,544	Husky Group of Companies	1,000	HDA Engineering Ltd	1,000
Toronto Dominion Bank	1,536	TCRT Investments	1,000	Knight Archer Insurance	989
Cameco Corporation	1,512	Husky Energy	992	Cameco Corporation	960
Conexus Credit Union	1,512	Potash Corp of Saskatchewan	992	P3 Architecture Ltd	884
Greystone Management Investments Inc	1,512	Range Royal Management	992	Penn West Energy Trust	880
MacPherson Leslie and Tyerman LLP	1,512	RBC Financial Group	992	Sherritt Coal	864
McDougall Gauley LLP	1,512	Saunders Evan Plosker Wotherspoon Architects	992	Balfour Moss LLP	824
Resource Management International Inc	1,512	North Ridge Development Corp	908	Evraz IPSCO Inc	824
RBC Royal Bank	1,500	TD Bank Financial Group	900	SaskFilm and Video Development Corp	794
Great Western Brewing Inc	1,444	Knight Archer Insurance	891	Agrium Partnership	720
Westwind Aviation	1,422	Balfour Moss LLP	844	AMEC Americas	720
Brian Kenny Legal Prof Corp	1,000	Clifton Associates	824	Areva Resources of Canada Inc	720
Leonard Andrychuk Legal Prof Corp	1,000	March Consulting Associates	824	Potash Corp of Saskatchewan	720
AMEC America	776	TD Canada Trust	824	University of Saskatchewan	720
Associated Engineering	776	Trans Canada Pipelines Ltd	824	CTV	712
TOTAL	\$105,431	TOTAL	\$107,042	TOTAL	\$42,943

Legend for Spatial Network Maps

Organizations

CAN	Canadian Nuclear Association
CBA_EX	Canadian Bankers Association Executive Council
CBC	Conference Board of Canada
CCE	Canadian Council of Chief Executives
CDH	C.D. Howe Institute
CLW	Canada Labour Watch
CPP	Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
CPTX	Canpotex
CUC	Credit Union Central
CWF	Canada West Foundation
ESB_DAC	Edwards School of Business Dean's Advisory Council
ESK	Enterprise Saskatchewan
FRI	Fraser Institute
JA_SK	Junior Achievement Saskatchewan
LSB_UR	Levene Graduate School of Business University of Regina
MCA	Merit Contractors Association
NSBA	North Saskatoon Business Association
PJH_CEO	Paul J. Hill Business School CEO Advisory Circle
RCC	Regina Chamber of Commerce
SCA	Saskatchewan Construction Association
SCC	Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce
SKP	Sask Pork
STN_CC	Saskatoon Chamber of Commerce

UA_BAC University of Alberta Business Advisory Council

UR_BoG University of Regina Board of Governors

Corporations

56559_SK	565509 Saskatchewan Ltd (Media/Communications)
ACU	Affinity Credit Union (Banking/Finance)
AGRIUM	Agrium (Agriculture)
ALL_EN	Alliance Energy (Construction)
ALL_PIPE	Alliance Pipeline (Energy Service)
APEGS	Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists Saskatchewan
ARC	Areva Resources Canada (Uranium/Energy)
BGLT_IND	Bourgault Industries (Agricultural Equipment)
BI	Brandt Industries/Tractor (Agricultural Equipment)
BKLPC	Brian Kenney Legal Prof Corp (Legal Services)
BRP	Bruce Power (Nuclear Power/Energy)
BTX_EN	Baytex Energy (Oil/Energy)
CAV_ENT	Cavalier Enterprises (Hotel Management/Real Estate)
CDN_HELI	Canadian Helicopter (Transportation)
CEN_EN	Cenovus Energy (Oil/Energy)
CHD	Canadian Hydro Developers (Subsumed by TransAlta)
CIBC	Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (Banking/Finance)

CMCO_CRP	Cameco Corporation (Uranium/Energy)	NEXEN	Nexen Energy (Oil/Energy)
CNR	Canadian Natural Resources (Oil/Energy)	NORTH_DEV	Northridge Development (Real Estate/Property Development)
CNR_Echo	CNR Echo Resources (Oil/Energy)	PCS	Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan (Potash/Mining)
CNXS	Conexus Credit Union (Banking/Finance)	PHI	Peace Hills Insurance (Insurance)
CON_GRP	Concorde Group (Real Estate/Property Management)	PM_R	Prairie Mines and Royalty (Coal/Mining)
CP_EN	Crescent Point Energy (Oil/Energy)	RBC	Royal Bank of Canada (Banking/Finance)
CWB	Canadian Western Bank (Banking/Finance)	RR_LTD	Range Royalty Ltd (Energy Service)
EN_PIPE	Enbridge Pipeline (Energy Service)	RWLCO	Rawlco Radio (Media/Communications)
EPLUS	Enerplus (Oil/Energy)	SCTABK	Scotiabank (Banking/Finance)
GWB	Great Western Brewers (Beverage)	SEPW	SEPW Architecture
HGC	Hill Group of Companies (Real Estate, Property Development)	SHRT_INTL	Sherritt Coal International (Coal/Mining)
HUSK_EN	Husky Energy (Oil/Energy)	SIN_PORK	Sinnett Pork (Agriculture)
KPMG	KPMG (Accounting/Consulting Services)	SK_CNRL	SaskCentral (Banking/Finance)
LALPC	Leonard Andrychuk Legal Prof Corp (Legal Services)	SK_EN	SaskEnergy
LDSP	Loraas Disposal (Waste Management)	SK_FILM	SaskFilm (Media/Communications)
LIC	Lehigh Inland Cement (Construction)	SK_PWR	SaskPower
MCA	Merit Contractors Association (Construction Employers Association)	SK_TEL	SaskTel
MEL_DEV	Melcor Development (Real Estate/Property Development)	TDB	Toronto Dominion Bank (Banking/Finance)
MLP_LL	MacPherson Leslie and Tyerman LLP (Legal Services)	TNSALTA	Transalta (Electrical Utility/Energy Service)
MOSC	Mosaic (Potash/Mining)	TSM_EN	Talisman Energy (Oil/Energy)
MPS	Medallion Pipe Supply (Construction/Mining Services)	VTA	Viterra (Agriculture/Transport)
		WC_MGT	Westcap Management (Banking/Finance)
		WFG	Western Financial Group (Insurance)
		WHTN_LTD	Wheaton Ltd (Automobile Sales)
		WWA	Westwind Aviation (Transportation)

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Endnotes

- 1 All financial data on corporate contributions to the Saskatchewan Party and the New Democratic Party were drawn from each party's respective "Registered Political Party Fiscal Period Return (E-521)" as filed with Elections Saskatchewan. <http://www.elections.sk.ca/finance/registered-political-partys-fiscal-period-return-e-521>
- 2 The BCNI changed its name to the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE) in 2001.
- 3 Government documents obtained by *The Globe and Mail* regarding the Wakefield, QC meetings revealed that Finance Minister Jim Flaherty was urged by the CEOs in attendance to "adopt measures to reduce the pay of Canadian workers, limit union power by enacting U.S.-style right-to-work legislation, and allow two-tier health care" (See Curry, 2012).
- 4 As was mentioned at the outset, we drew our sample from the top 28 corporate contributors to both major provincial political parties in the three years from 2008 to 2010. With the recent release of the 2011 Fiscal Period Return, we incorporated the 2011 numbers into the total corporate contributions between 2008 and 2011. A full list of the corporations and the size of their contributions can be found on pages 25 and 26.
- 5 For a more detailed history of Junior Achievement, see Sharon Beder (2006). *Free Market Missionaries*. London: Earthscan.
- 6 We searched the ISC Corporate registry for contributions from numbered companies of \$2000 or more for 2011. Paul J. Hill was listed as President for six numbered companies that contributed more than \$2000 to the Saskatchewan Party:

101094207 Saskatchewan Ltd	\$2900
101017689 Saskatchewan Ltd	\$3500
101014235 Saskatchewan Ltd	\$2900
101000672 Saskatchewan Ltd	\$4300
629892 Saskatchewan Ltd	\$3200
584770 Saskatchewan Ltd	\$2900



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